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FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
 
Amy Sinden* 
 
Abstract 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is usually treated as a monolith. In fact, 
the term can refer to a broad variety of decisionmaking practices, ranging 
from a qualitative comparison of pros and cons to a highly formalized and 
technical method grounded in economic theory that monetizes both costs 
and benefits, discounts to present net value, and locates the point at which 
the marginal benefits curve crosses the marginal costs curve. This article 
develops a typology that helps to conceptualize the multiple varieties of 
CBA along a formality-informality spectrum. It then uses this typology to 
analyze the treatment of CBA by the academic community and the three 
branches of the federal government. In academic and policy circles, the 
formal end of this spectrum generates far more controversy than the 
informal end. Additionally, the law (federal environmental statutes and 
case law) seems to favor informal over formal varieties of CBA. 
Nonetheless, the executive branch appears to be moving toward the formal 
end of the spectrum. Executive Orders and guidance documents direct 
agencies to conduct a highly formal mode of CBA. And anecdotal evidence 
suggests that agencies often go out of their way to give their CBAs the 
trappings of formality, sometimes in ways that lead to irrational results. I 
argue that 1) failing to distinguish between formal and informal CBA, and 
the many varieties in between, has led to muddled thinking and to misuses 
of CBA; and 2) the trend toward formality in the executive branch is out 
of step with Congress and the courts and may be counterproductive, 
where, for example, it leads to what I call “false formality”—a corruption 
of CBA that can occur when agencies fail to clearly and consistently define 
where on the formality-informality spectrum a particular CBA falls.  
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[M]y way is to divide half a sheet of paper 
by a line into two columns; writing over the 
one Pro, and over the other Con. Then, 
during three or four days consideration, I 
put down under the different heads short 
hints of the different motives, that at different 
times occur to me, for or against the 
measure. When I have thus got them all 
together in one view, I endeavor to estimate 
their respective weights . . . . And, though the 
weight of reasons cannot be taken with the 
precision of algebraic quantities, yet when 
each is thus considered, separately and 
comparatively, and the whole lies before me, 
I think I can judge better, and am less liable 
to take a rash step, and in fact I have found 
great advantage from this kind of equation, 
in what may be called moral or prudential 
algebra. 
Letter from Benjamin 
Franklin to Joseph 
Priestley (Sept. 19, 
1772)1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A debate has been raging for decades over whether to use cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) in evaluating government regulation.2 But the participants in this debate have 
                                                 
1 EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2d ed. 1990). 
2 For some early arguments in favor of CBA, see, for example, E. J. MISHAN, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 390 (1976); A. R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 
75 ECON. J. 683, 683–85 (1965). For some early critiques, see, for example, ARTHUR 
SMITHIES, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 344–46 (1955); Robert 
Dorfman, Forty Years of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ECONOMETRIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
PUBLIC POLICY 268 (Richard Stone & William Peterson eds. 1978). 
At least in the environmental arena, Congress has largely rejected CBA as a 
decisionmaking tool, instead directing the agencies to set standards using other criteria, like 
feasibility or the protection of public health. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 433 (2008); Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in 
the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 
(2004) [hereinafter Sinden, Endangered Species]. But beginning with President Ronald 
Reagan, every president has imposed, through executive order, a requirement on federal 
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not always been careful about defining terms. What, after all, do we mean by “cost-
benefit analysis”? The term can be used to describe a broad range of practices. On 
one end of the spectrum is a Ben Franklin-style listing of qualitatively described 
pros and cons. On the other end is a highly technical and formal analytic method 
grounded in economic theory that attempts to fully quantify and monetize all of the 
social costs and benefits of a whole range of regulatory options and then, by 
calculating the point at which the marginal benefits curve intersects the marginal 
costs curve, identify the economically efficient level of regulation. And between 
these two extremes lie yet more varieties of CBA. 
The two ends of this spectrum actually have very little in common, other than 
the general approach of juxtaposing positive and negative impacts. Informal CBA 
relies on qualitative descriptions intuitively compared and gives no more than 
general guidance. The most formal varieties of CBA, on the other hand, rely on 
numbers and mathematics and purport, at least, to provide precise answers. 
Moreover, the two techniques play entirely different roles in the decisionmaking 
process. Informal CBA provides no more than a secondary check on a decision that 
has been made by other means, while formal CBA provides, at least in theory, a 
standard-setting tool for identifying the optimal choice from among a whole range 
of regulatory alternatives.  
Despite this broad range of meanings, scholars and policymakers often use the 
term “cost-benefit analysis” (or “benefit-cost analysis”),3 without adjectives or 
qualifiers, as though it were a monolithic concept. This failure to distinguish 
                                                 
agencies to conduct CBA on all major rules, even when the statute does not allow the agency 
to make its decision on that basis. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 
(2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 
102–03 (2012); see infra notes 215 to 217 and accompanying text. As a result, agency use 
of CBA has increased over the past three decades. Nonetheless, debate continues over 
whether CBA makes regulation more rational or simply provides increased leverage for 
powerful industry stakeholders to downplay the benefits of regulation and manipulate agency 
decision making toward less stringency. Compare RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. 
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER 
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 13–16 (2008) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 19–20 (2002) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE] and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99, 120–23 (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON] and 
John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 395, 429, 432–38 (2008) with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON 
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) and Amy Sinden, 
In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 1405, 1410, 1452–60 (2005) [hereinafter Sinden, Defense of Absolutes]. 
3 The term “benefit-cost analysis” means exactly the same thing as “cost-benefit 
analysis” and is preferred by a number of proponents of CBA. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et 
al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221–22 (1996). 
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between the many varieties of CBA muddies the debate and can lead to irrational 
results that are, ironically, completely at odds with the common sense and 
reasonableness we ascribe to Ben Franklin.  
Once we approach the debate with an ear tuned to this divergent range of 
meanings, a peculiar pattern emerges. Scholars and commentators largely ignore 
these distinctions, but to the extent they do take note of CBA’s formal or informal 
characteristics, CBA skeptics tend to portray it as highly formalized, rigid, and 
technical. Indeed, their objections relate almost exclusively to problems specific to 
the formal versions of CBA: the conceptual difficulties that arise from trying to 
measure things like human lives and ecosystems in monetary terms, the 
controversies surrounding discount rates, the problem of wealth effects, the lack of 
scientific data precise enough to allow for meaningful quantification, and so on. 
Meanwhile, proponents of CBA are far more likely to paint it in Ben Franklin terms: 
as a simple, commonsense, rational weighing of pros and cons. Indeed, from this 
vantage point, it can often seem as though the two sides are talking past each other.  
Still, this pattern suggests that there is far more potential for broad consensus 
to support less formal versions of CBA. We might, then, expect to see agencies—
which tend to be averse to controversy—gravitating toward the informal end of the 
spectrum, at least to the extent that the law permits them to do so. But the actual 
trend appears to be in precisely the opposite direction. Despite the fact that both the 
federal courts and Congress seem to favor less formality in CBA,4 the executive 
branch appears to pull in the direction of increased formality. Executive orders and 
guidance documents direct agencies to conduct a fairly formal brand of CBA.5 And 
anecdotal evidence suggests that agencies sometimes go to great lengths to give their 
CBAs the trappings of formality in efforts that ultimately prove futile, or even 
irrational. Indeed, this is happening even in the face of a recent Supreme Court case, 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,6 in which the Court expressed a clear preference 
for informal over formal modes of CBA.7  
Thus, this pull toward formality in the executive branch sparks controversy in 
policy and academic circles and is out of step with Congress and the courts. 
Moreover, it may be counterproductive, where, for example, it leads to what I call 
“false formality.” This is a corruption of CBA that can occur when agencies fail to 
clearly define where on the formality-informality spectrum a particular CBA falls, 
and is one example of the kind of analytic sloppiness and muddled thinking that 
results from a failure to clearly distinguish among different forms of CBA. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes in more detail the 
distinctions between formal and informal CBA and presents a typology that helps to 
conceptualize and analyze the multiple varieties of CBA. Part III then reviews the 
academic debate over CBA and traces the role that conceptions of formality and 
                                                 
4 See discussion infra Part IV. 
5 See discussion infra Part V. 
6 556 U.S. 208 (2009). 
7 Id. at 226–27.  
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informality have played in the arguments put forth by proponents and skeptics. Part 
IV examines how Congress and the federal courts have made distinctions and 
choices between formal and informal versions of CBA in the context of 
environmental health and safety laws. Part V then analyzes the executive orders and 
guidance documents that govern the use of CBA by federal agencies and describes 
the rulemakings leading up to and following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Riverkeeper, in which the pull toward formality led the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) first to irrationality and then to futility. Parts IV and V focus 
primarily on the use of CBA in the context of environmental, health, and safety 
regulation because this is the area in which CBA has been most extensively used 
and in which agency sophistication is probably highest. Many aspects of the 
analysis, however, may well be more broadly applicable. Finally, Part VI describes 
the lessons this analysis suggests for the broader debate about CBA.  
 
II.  THE MULTIPLE FORMS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
Broadly speaking, CBA is a decisionmaking technique that weighs and 
compares the costs and benefits of a course of action.8 Within those broad outlines, 
                                                 
8 Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug 
Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 996 (1977) (“‘Risk-benefit analysis’ . . . 
includes any technique for making choices that explicitly or implicitly attempts to measure 
the potential adverse consequences of an activity and to predict its benefits.”); cf. Steven 
Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REG. 33, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33 (“At 
the broadest and vaguest level, cost-benefit analysis may be regarded simply as systematic 
thinking about decision-making.”). 
In theory, a CBA could consist of just the tasks of toting up total costs and total benefits 
without actually comparing them. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
510 (8th ed. 2011) (“[C]ost-benefit analysis can refer to a method of pure evaluation, 
conducted without regard to the possible use of its results in a decision . . . .”). Such an 
analysis would provide information only, with no explicit guidance on whether the analyzed 
regulation is a good or bad idea. Some authors sometimes appear to define CBA in this way. 
See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 
1498 (2002) (describing CBA “as a tool and a procedure, rather than as a rigid formula to 
govern outcomes” that “requires a full accounting of the consequences of an action, in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms [that] [o]fficials should have . . . before them when they 
make decisions”); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 
335, 339 (2006) (“CBA of a proposed regulation consists of estimates of the regulation’s 
costs and . . . benefits.”). But it strains credibility to imagine that CBA is ever really treated 
that way in practice. Once costs and benefits are both toted up, it is hard to imagine the 
analyst not, at least implicitly, comparing them. Because I view some comparison of the 
costs to the benefits as integral to the enterprise of CBA, I have defined it to explicitly include 
that comparison. As discussed below, the manner in which the comparison is performed (i.e., 
the balancing formula used) can vary considerably.  
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however, it can refer to a wide and divergent array of procedures and practices.9 At 
one end of the spectrum is the “prudential algebra” Ben Franklin described in his 
letter to his friend, Joseph Priestley.10 This involves identifying benefits and costs 
(pros and cons) in purely qualitative terms, listing them in two columns on a sheet 
of paper, and then making a judgment about their relative weights. This is all done 
without actually attempting to convert them into numeric or monetized terms—that 
is, heeding Ben Franklin’s advice that “the weight of reasons cannot be taken with 
the precision of algebraic quantities . . . .”11 At the other end of the spectrum is a 
highly technical and theorized branch of welfare economics that attempts to quantify 
and monetize all social costs and benefits for a whole range of alternatives using 
formal techniques—including discounting future costs and benefits to present net 
value—and then attempts to pinpoint the course of action for which marginal 
benefits are just equal to marginal costs.12 
Informal, Ben-Franklin-style CBA is intuitive—almost a matter of common 
sense. Many of us perform some version of it as a matter of course when making 
major life decisions. Understanding the most formal version of CBA, on the other 
                                                 
9 Several others have also distinguished between different forms of CBA. See John C. 
Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications 
124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (distinguishing between “quantified CBA,” 
“guesstimated CBA,” and “conceptual CBA”); Jonathan Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: 
Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 
428–29 (2010) (distinguishing between strong vs. weak forms of CBA); Graham, supra note 
2, at 432–38 (distinguishing between soft vs. hard forms of CBA); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 39 
(1999) (distinguishing between CBA aimed at economic efficiency versus “soft” CBA, 
“which would compare costs and benefits without attempting to quantify every factor”). 
10 GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph 
Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772)). 
11 Id. 
12 See Merrill, supra note 8, at 996 (describing this kind of formal CBA as CBA “[i]n 
its most refined form”). Note that cost-effectiveness analysis—a form of analysis that often 
accompanies CBA—does not appear anywhere on this spectrum. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
is a distinct form of analysis with a fundamentally different analytic structure. While CBA 
measures all the social costs and social benefits of a given course of action and compares 
them, cost-effectiveness analysis takes a single regulatory goal or endpoint (e.g., saving one 
human life) and compares the costs of reaching that goal under various regulatory 
alternatives. See E. J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 8 (5th ed. 2007); 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES xi 
(2014) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vw 
AN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GA38-AUXP. Thus, 
cost-effectiveness analysis does not purport to measure the total net social benefits of a 
course of action as CBA does, and, rather than comparing overall social costs directly to 
overall social benefits, cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of various alternative 
methods for achieving a single regulatory benefit. 
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hand, requires some grounding in the basics of welfare economics, which the 
following section provides. 
 
A.  Welfare Economics and CBA 
 
Welfare economics is the normative branch of economics. It traces its roots to 
utilitarianism and is built around the normative principle of “efficiency”—that is, 
the maximization of the overall welfare of members of society in the aggregate.13 
Measuring aggregate “welfare” has always been problematic, however. The early 
welfare economists rejected the notion that welfare or levels of happiness could be 
compared across individuals.14 Nineteenth century social scientist, Vilfredo Pareto, 
found a way around this problem by constructing a definition of efficiency that 
avoids trading off one person’s welfare gain or loss against another’s.15 Under what 
is now known as the Pareto Principle, one state of affairs is a “Pareto improvement” 
over another if it would result in at least one person being better off and no one being 
worse off.16 A situation is “Pareto optimum” or “Pareto efficient,” therefore, if there 
is no alternative state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement.17 
Under the laws of welfare economics, Pareto efficiency will be achieved by a 
perfectly functioning market18—one in which participants act rationally (consumers 
maximize “utility,” or preference satisfaction, and producers maximize profits), 
there are no transaction costs, information is perfect, and all social costs and benefits 
are accounted for in private costs and benefits (i.e., there are no externalities).19 To 
get an intuitive sense of why this is so, consider that in a perfect market, every 
transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer produces a Pareto 
                                                 
13 See Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351–52 
(1999). But see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 103, 129–30 (1979) (explaining distinctions between welfare economics and 
utilitarianism). 
14 See Sen, supra note 13, at 352 (“Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and 
no common denominator of feelings is possible.” (citation omitted)); Oscar Lange, The 
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 10 ECONOMETRICA 215, 215 (1942) (stating that 
interpersonal comparisons have a “lack of operational significance”). But see Sen, supra note 
13, at 356–60 (arguing that interpersonal welfare comparisons are possible).  
15 See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 31. 
16 Id. 
17 See Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 588, 588 (1954); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 121, 127 (1991). But see Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 
ECONOMICA 217, 235 (1976) (arguing that Pareto principle is inconsistent with basic liberal 
rights); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 19–21 (2006) (describing objections to the Pareto standard). 
18 See ROGER PERMAN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
90–93 (1996). 
19 See id.; ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND 
PRACTICE 53 (4th ed. 2011). 
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improvement. Since the transaction is voluntary, both buyer and seller enjoy an 
increase in welfare.20 Moreover, since in a perfect market there are no externalities, 
all of the costs and benefits associated with the transaction accrue to the two parties, 
and no one else is made worse off. Thus, under perfect conditions, the market will 
reach an equilibrium point of Pareto efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no 
alternative state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement.21  
Where the market is imperfect, however—where, for example, manufacturing 
some market good produces an externality like pollution that makes people sick or 
harms ecosystems—it will fail to achieve Pareto efficiency. In such circumstances 
it is appropriate, according to economic theory, for government to intervene with 
regulation to try to correct the market failure. But, economists argue, when 
government does step in, it should calibrate its regulation to mimic the economically 
efficient outcome that a perfectly functioning market would have produced.  
This is where CBA comes in. Economists use CBA to try to identify the 
perfectly efficient level of regulation. The problem is that any attempt to use Pareto 
efficiency as the standard for judging the efficiency of government intervention is 
impractical.22 First, it is probably impossible to find a government action that does 
not cause harm to at least one person. Thus, virtually all government intervention 
would fail a Pareto-efficiency test. Second, the informational burden of trying to 
break down aggregate costs and benefits into individual costs and benefits is 
insurmountable. Accordingly, for these purposes, many economists turn to a slightly 
different definition of efficiency with “somewhat less conceptual appeal, but much 
greater feasibility” known as “potential Pareto” or “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency.23 
Under this definition, a government regulation is more efficient than the status quo 
if those who stand to benefit from the regulation could fully compensate those who 
stand to lose from it and still be better off. Or, put another way, a regulation is more 
efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if, following a hypothetical transfer of wealth 
from the winners to the losers, the resulting state of affairs would be a Pareto 
improvement.24 Notice that a regulation meets this test whether or not the 
hypothetical wealth transfer occurs (and it virtually never does).25 
Thus, many economists use the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rather than 
Pareto efficiency as the basis for evaluating regulations and other public projects 
                                                 
20 See POSNER, supra note 8, at 20. 
21 RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 23 (2d ed. 1996); see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 158 (17th ed. 2001) (explaining that perfectly competitive markets 
create a state of “allocative efficiency,” meaning that “no possible reorganization of 
production can make anyone better off without making someone else worse off”). 
22 See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 31–32.  
23 BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 32; POSNER, supra note 8, at 17–20. 
24 BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 32; MISHAN, supra note 2, at 390–91. 
25 See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 32. 
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and policies under CBA.26 In this way, they defend CBA as a normative standard 
for judging government intervention, while recognizing that it performs an imperfect 
imitation of the Pareto efficiency produced by a perfect market and no longer avoids 
the philosophical conundrums associated with interpersonal welfare comparisons 
that Pareto efficiency so effectively sidesteps.27  
Accordingly, any regulation for which total social benefits exceed total social 
costs (in comparison to the status quo) constitutes a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. 
And an economist could, in theory at least, identify the level of regulation that is 
optimally efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense by measuring all of the social costs 
and benefits of a whole range of regulatory alternatives and then locating the 
alternative that provides the highest level of net social benefit.28 On the graph in 
Figure 1, for example, the third alternative (“even more stringent regulation”) would 
be the “efficient” one in the language of economic theory because it provides the 
highest net social benefit, even though the fourth alternative (“most stringent”) 
provides higher benefits in absolute terms. 
  
                                                 
26 Id. This might be considered the mainstream view, at least in this country, but the 
discipline of economics is hardly a monolith and there are plenty of economists who reject 
this approach. See, e.g., David Ellerman, On a Fallacy in the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency-Equity 
Analysis, 25 CONST. POL. ECON. 125, 127–28 (2014); see also ADLER & POSNER, supra note 
27, at 21–24 (rejecting Kaldor-Hicks defense of CBA). In the United Kingdom and Europe, 
the dominant approach to CBA grounds it in the idea of a social welfare function rather than 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Matthew D. Adler et al., The Social Value of Mortality Risk 
Reduction: VSL Versus the Social Welfare Function Approach, 35 J. HEALTH ECON. 82, 82 
(2014) (comparing the differing approaches of the United States and United Kingdom to 
cost-benefit analysis). For an explanation of social welfare functions, see PERMAN ET AL., 
supra note 18, at 27–37, 85–86. 
27 See MISHAN, supra note 2, at 382–96; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 190 (1999) (noting that “[m]ost 
economists appear to concede that the Kaldor-Hicks standard is not, by itself, normatively 
desirable” but defend it nonetheless on the grounds that benefits to winners and costs to 
losers will wash out in the end). 
28 EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 137 
(1978); see BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 13, 33; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 9–10 (2003). 
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FIGURE 1. Total costs and benefits of varying levels of regulation. 
 
Ideally, the economist would have enough data on the costs and benefits of 
incrementally more and less stringent regulatory alternatives to plot on a graph the 
marginal benefits and marginal costs of regulation at each possible level of 
stringency. (The change in the level of costs or benefits produced by each 
incremental change in the stringency of the regulation is called a “marginal cost” or 
a “marginal benefit.”) In many instances, the relationship between costs and benefits 
is something like that shown in Figure 2. That is, marginal benefits exceed costs at 
low levels of stringency, but as the stringency of regulation increases the marginal 
costs gradually increase while the marginal benefits gradually decrease until the two 
lines cross, and at higher levels of stringency, marginal costs exceed marginal 
benefits. In such a case, the level of regulation at which net benefits are 
maximized—the point of optimal Kaldor-Hicks efficiency29—is the level at which 
the two curves cross, that is, where marginal costs are just equal to marginal 
benefits.30 Figure 2 illustrates this idea. Thus, assuming (1) sufficient data, (2) 
                                                 
29 Notice that I use the term “efficiency” interchangeably with “optimal efficiency” to 
refer to a state of net benefits maximization. Some authors use the term “efficiency” in the 
context of welfare economics more loosely, to refer to any state of affairs that increases net 
benefits over the status quo, even if it does not achieve net benefits maximization.  
30 See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 33–36; TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 25, 66 (5th ed. 2000); Richard D. Morgenstern, 
Conducting an Economic Analysis: Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 25, 40 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 
1997); Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221. 
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relevant values that can all be meaningfully monetized, and (3) technologies that 
allow for incrementally varying levels of control (three big assumptions), an 
economist would be able to identify the point of economic efficiency.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Marginal costs and benefits of incrementally varying levels of regulation. 
 
Welfare economics, then, presumes a kind of cost-benefit analysis that 
measures the social costs and benefits of many alternative regulations at 
incrementally varying levels of stringency. Moreover, because the purpose is to 
identify the precise point at which marginal costs just equal marginal benefits, this 
form of CBA must quantify all of the social costs and all of the social benefits for 
each regulatory alternative and convert all of those quantities into a common metric 
(usually dollars) so that, for each alternative, all costs and benefits can be aggregated 
and compared.31 
 
B.  Complications and Critiques 
 
This quantification and monetization raises a host of complications. In many 
instances, we simply lack good information and data on how much a regulation will 
                                                 
31 See MISHAN, supra note 2, at 180–81. 
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cost or on the benefits it might provide to human or ecological health.32 But more 
fundamentally, using dollars to measure nonmarket goods—like saving people from 
dying of cancer or an endangered species from extinction—raises a host of 
intractable theoretical problems. Some take the position that converting such values 
to a monetary (or any other common) metric confronts incommensurability 
problems that are simply insurmountable.33 And there are other, more subtle 
problems as well. 
First, in order to aggregate and compare costs and benefits that will not accrue 
until a future date alongside those accrued in the present, cost-benefit analysis 
typically applies a discount rate to future costs and benefits. While such discounting 
makes sense when comparing purely monetary sums, when applied to natural 
resources, human lives, and future generations, it confronts deep theoretical 
difficulties.34 Even those who view discounting of such values as appropriate are far 
from consensus on the proper method for setting the rate.35 As a result, the discount 
rates applied in practice vary widely and yield wildly differing outcomes when 
applied to time periods of a decade or more.36  
Additionally, dollars do not provide a consistent measure of value across rich 
and poor people because of the declining marginal value of money (the fact that a 
dollar is worth more to a poor person than to a rich person) and the fact that 
willingness to pay is constrained by ability to pay.37 A phenomenon known as “the 
                                                 
32 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 134 (1991); Ronnie Levin, Lead 
in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 30, at 205, 230; Amy 
Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits at 21–27 (March 16, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Utah Law Review). 
33 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55–59 (1993); MARK 
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1–7 
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
841–42 (1994); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1465–66 (2014) (critiquing the Department of Justice’s attempts to 
quantify the costs of prison rape) (“To ask how much victims of sexual assault would be 
willing to accept assault is . . . to misunderstand the very nature of the crime . . . .”).  
34 Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007); 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting 
of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 955–86 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our 
Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999). 
35 Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 57 
(2012) (“In the literature, one finds a large range of acceptable values for discount rates . . . 
large enough to permit the strategic manipulation of outcomes . . . .”). 
36 Id. at 57–62. 
37 Some argue that CBA can be designed to incorporate distributional weightings in 
order to correct for the problem of wealth effects. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview (Duke Envtl. & Energy Econ. Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. EE 13-04, 2013), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3110, archived at http://perma.cc/5M 
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endowment effect” presents a related problem. Experiments show that people 
demand significantly more to give up a good that they already have than they are 
willing to pay to obtain the same good if they do not have it yet.38 Any attempt to 
measure values in dollar terms is accordingly indeterminate. 
Despite these problems, economists have developed a number of clever 
techniques for trying to divine the monetary value of things not traded in markets.39 
Hedonic surveys are an example of a “revealed preference” technique. These 
surveys attempt to infer a dollar value for nonmarket goods by observing things that 
are traded in markets and are thought to reflect (or “reveal”) the unpriced value.40 
Thus, an economist might attempt to measure the value people attach to unspoiled 
open space by comparing the prices of otherwise comparable properties located 
adjacent to spoiled and unspoiled areas.41 Or an economist might measure the 
recreational “use value” attached to natural resources by measuring the admission 
fees and travel costs hikers pay to visit a national park.42  
                                                 
99-EHFV; Gregory Scott Crespi, Correcting for the Wealth Bias of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Through Use of “Percentage of Wealth”-based Valuations, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 149, 
149–56 (2013). But this is an underdeveloped and controversial technique. See Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 335, 339 (2011). 
38 See John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 426–47 (2002); Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy 
Implications of Disparities Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded 
Measures of Values, 18. J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 227, 227–37 (1990); but see generally 
Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the 
“Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting 
Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (arguing that previous experiments 
demonstrating a gap between willingness to pay and willingness to accept were skewed by 
subject misconceptions, and reporting results of experiment controlling for all previously 
identified sources of subject misconception that found no such gap). 
39 See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & ANIL MARKANDYA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
BENEFITS: MONETARY VALUATION (1989) (discussing various direct and indirect benefit 
valuation techniques, including hedonic and contingent valuation methods). 
40 See generally David S. Brookshire et al., Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of 
Survey and Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982); see also BOARDMAN ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 353–57; Philip E. Graves, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental 
Projects: A Plethora of Biases Understating Net Benefits, 3 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1, 
12–19 (2012). 
41 E.g., Richard Ready & Charles Abdalla, The Impact of Open Space and Potential 
Local Disamenities on Residential Property Values in Berks County, Pennsylvania (Pa. State 
Univ. Dep’t Agric. Econ. & Rural Sociology, Staff Paper No. 363, 2003), available at 
http://aese.psu.edu/directory/aic/the-impact-of-open-space-and-potential-local-disamenities 
-on-residential-property-values-in-berks-county-pennsylvania, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
2W4Z-JZ6V. 
42 See Shi-Ling Hsu & John Loomis, A Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Natural 
Resource Policy, [2002] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,239, 10,242 (Feb. 2002); 
BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 358–65. 
2015] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 107 
 
Alternatively, where values can’t be “revealed” through actual market 
transactions, economists turn to “stated preference” methods. “Contingent 
valuation” surveys—also called “stated-preference surveys”—attempt to determine 
people’s willingness to pay for nonmarket goods by simply asking them.43 In what 
is essentially a sophisticated public-opinion poll, respondents are given information 
about a particular natural resource or medical condition and then asked how much 
they would be willing to pay to preserve the resource or avoid the disease. One such 
stated-preference survey, for example, concludes that the average California 
household is willing to pay $18.14 per year to increase gray whale populations by 
100 percent.44 Another concludes that the average person is willing to pay $457,000 
to avoid contracting chronic bronchitis.45 
All of these methods are controversial and produce highly contestable results.46 
One problem, for example, is the endowment effect, discussed above. Even though 
measuring willingness to pay (to buy) versus willingness to accept (to sell) yields 
different values for the same good, economists have yet to come up with any 
principled basis for choosing between these two measures of value. This makes 
stated-preference surveys, which are almost always designed to measure willingness 
to pay, vulnerable to criticism that they underestimate the values they try to measure. 
In sum, the kind of CBA that emerges out of the theory of welfare economics 
is highly formal, complex, and technical—a far cry from Ben Franklin’s prudential 
algebra. Using these two extremes as a starting point, the next section develops a 
typology of formality and informality in CBA. 
 
C.  Formality and Informality in CBA: A Typology 
 
The two forms of CBA described in the previous section, which I will refer to 
as “Ben Franklin CBA” and “Economic CBA,” define two ends of a spectrum from 
informality to formality. Many forms of CBA fall somewhere in between. By 
defining the two extremes, however, we can see that these different forms of CBA 
have characteristics that vary along three distinct but related axes.  
                                                 
43 See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 372–405; Hsu & Loomis, supra note 42, at 
10,242; Thomas H. Stevens et al., Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM 
Estimates Really Show?, 67 LAND ECON. 390, 392–97 (1991). For a critique, see generally 
John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995). 
44 John B. Loomis & Douglas M. Larson, Total Economic Values of Increasing Gray 
Whale Populations: Results from a Contingent Valuation Survey of Visitors and Households, 
9 MARINE RES. ECON. 275, 282 tbl.1 (1994). 
45 See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments 
of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 32, 47, 50 (1991). 
46 See DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 141–58 (1990); Leonard Shabman & Kurt Stephenson, 
Environmental Valuation and Its Economic Critics, 126 J. WATER RES. PLAN. & MGMT. 382, 
382–84 (2000).  
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Axis 1 describes the level of quantification and monetization involved in the 
assessment of costs and benefits. Axis 2 describes the degree of precision with which 
the comparison is made.47 And Axis 3 describes the number of regulatory 
alternatives for which cost/benefit estimates are generated. As discussed below, 
these three axes are related in that where a particular CBA falls along one axis may 
affect where it can logically fall along the other two. 
 
1.  The Three Axes 
 
Axis 1, as illustrated in Figure 3, extends from the purely qualitative description 
of pros and cons involved in a Ben Franklin CBA on the left, to the full quantification 
and monetization of all aspects of social costs and benefits that is required for an 
Economic CBA on the right. There are obviously an infinite variety of possibilities 
between these two extremes, only a few of which are described in the boxes on the 
diagram. Costs and/or benefits may be partially quantified to varying degrees. And 
even where there is quantification, there may not be monetization, leaving costs and 
benefits expressed in different metrics. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Axis 1. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that an analysis that falls all the way to the right on 
Axis 1—that is, that fully monetizes absolutely all costs and benefits—is 
undoubtedly impossible to achieve in practice.48 Even the next box to the left (“All 
significant costs & benefits quantified and monetized”) is probably impossible to 
achieve in practice much of the time, at least with respect to environmental 
regulation, although this is a more controversial statement.49 Indeed, much 
                                                 
47 Professor David Driesen has previously identified some of the points along this axis, 
calling them the “efficiency criterion,” the “no excess cost criterion,” and the 
“proportionality criterion” (“costs should not grossly exceed benefits”). David M. Driesen, 
Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2011); Driesen, supra note 8, at 387–94. 
48 See, e.g., MICHAEL FAURE & GÖRAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 166 (2003) (“All costs and benefits 
are, in reality, of course, not measurable.”); BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 10–12 
(discussing various impediments to full quantification and monetization). 
49 See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (noting that quantifying and monetizing 
environmental values is “especially contentious”). 
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disagreement between the supporters and skeptics of CBA probably boils down to 
differing beliefs about the feasibility of getting somewhere close to the right end of 
Axis 1 in practice. 
Axis 2, illustrated in Figure 4, describes the precision of the balancing test used 
to compare costs and benefits. This axis extends from the rough, apples-to-oranges 
comparison that occurs under Ben Franklin CBA on the left, to, on the other end, 
pinpointing the level of regulatory stringency at which marginal benefits and 
marginal costs are just equal in order to identify the point of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
under Economic CBA. Here there are also a variety of possibilities in between the 
two extremes, the most prominent of which are identified in the boxes in Figure 4.  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Axis 2. 
 
The balancing tests along Axis 2 actually vary along two separate dimensions. 
First, they vary with respect to the precision with which costs and benefits must be 
compared. Locating the point at which marginal costs and benefits are equal requires 
more precision than a rough comparison. Second, some of the tests vary with respect 
to the proportion of benefits to costs that triggers the tipping point—in other words, 
where the fulcrum is placed on the scales. Thus, the third box from the right (“precise 
comparison to ensure benefits exceed costs”) probably requires at least a 1.1 to 1 
ratio of benefits to costs, while the “costs not wholly disproportionate to benefits” 
test might put the tipping point at 1 to 5 or even 1 to 25.50 On the other end of the 
spectrum, Economic CBA requires total benefits to exceed total costs as much as 
possible (maximization of net benefits).  
In principle, the placement of the fulcrum doesn’t necessarily have any 
connection to formality or informality. It could simply reflect a judgment by, say, 
Congress about where it wants the risk of error to fall. (A wholly disproportionate 
test allows more regulation through than a benefits-exceed-costs test.) Notice in this 
regard that the tests are not arrayed in order on Axis 2 with respect to fulcrum 
placement: the left-most box (“rough comparison”) probably puts the fulcrum in 
                                                 
50 Note that under Economic CBA, comparing costs and benefits through the ratio of 
the two is inappropriate because it is the absolute amount of net benefits to society that is 
important. See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 42; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-
4, at 10 (2003). 
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about the same place as the third box from the right (“precise comparison to ensure 
benefits exceed costs”).51 
In practice, however, the position of the fulcrum ends up also having 
implications for the level of precision used in the balance. Thus, the balancing test 
for Economic CBA in the rightmost position on Axis 2 requires a fulcrum shift—
benefits must exceed costs as much as possible. But that fulcrum shift also implies 
a precise balance, because finding the point of net benefits maximization requires 
locating the point where marginal costs and benefits are just equal. The wholly 
disproportionate test probably operates similarly. One could in principle interpret 
this test to impose a precise tipping point; for example, benefits that are 10% of costs 
are okay, but benefits at 9% of costs are not. In practice, however, it seems likely 
that the real significance of the fulcrum shifting accomplished by the wholly 
disproportionate standard is that it allows for a rougher comparison. One can tell 
from a distance whether two elements are wholly disproportionate, even if the 
picture is fuzzy. Discerning whether one element just exceeds another, however, 
may require a sharper, more precise image.52 Accordingly, with the caveats stated 
above, I have chosen to arrange these balancing tests on a single axis, placing the 
emphasis on the precision of the balance (an aspect of formality) rather than the 
placement of the fulcrum.  
Axis 3, illustrated in Figure 5, describes the number of alternatives for which 
costs and benefits are evaluated and compared. This can obviously range from a 
single alternative to the full spectrum of incrementally varying alternatives that 
would be necessary in order to graph the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves 
for an Economic CBA. Here, too, there are of course many possible points in 
between—as many as there are incrementally varying alternatives.  
 
 
FIGURE 5. Axis 3. 
 
                                                 
51 A break-even analysis, which is essentially a way of trying to get a handle on whether 
benefits exceed costs when benefits are only partially monetized, also puts the fulcrum in the 
same place. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
52 The EPA, at least, appears to treat the standard this way. See infra notes 299–300 and 
accompanying text (describing the EPA’s stated justification for using a wholly 
disproportionate test in the cooling water intake rule under the Clean Water Act: “important 
benefit effect categories will very likely not be able to be quantified and monetized”). 
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Axis 3 is overidealized and potentially misleading to the extent it suggests that 
alternatives can always be neatly ranked in linear fashion along an ordinal scale.53 
Sometimes—where, for example, the relevant technologies allow for incrementally 
varying levels of pollution control—such a linear ranking will be possible. But in 
other instances (e.g., where the question is whether to build a shopping mall or a 
housing development on endangered species habitat) a linear ranking may not be 
possible.54 Nonetheless, with these caveats, this admittedly over-simplified 
depiction is useful for purposes of this typology. 
 
2.  The Relationship Between Axes 1 and 2 
 
Once we have mapped out these three axes, we can begin to see the 
relationships between them. The relationships between Axes 1 and 2 are depicted in 
Figure 6 below. Moving toward a more precise and formal balancing test along Axis 
2, for example, probably requires a parallel move toward formality (and increased 
quantification and monetization) along Axis 1. A CBA cannot, for example, pinpoint 
the level at which marginal costs just equal marginal benefits (the right-most 
position on Axis 2) without fully quantifying and monetizing all costs and benefits 
(the right-most position on Axis 1). Even moving to the third box from the right on 
Axis 2 (“precise comparison to ensure benefits exceed costs”) will likely pose 
difficulties for a CBA not occupying one of the two right-most boxes on Axis 1.  
 
                                                 
53 It is also impossible in practice, of course, to take all conceivable alternatives into 
account. And the decision about which alternatives to include can make formal CBA highly 
vulnerable to manipulation. See Catherine A. O’Neill, The Mathematics of Mercury, in 
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 108, 113 (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 
2009).  
54 In such an instance, the analyst could still, theoretically, identify the alternative that 
maximized net benefits, though constructing meaningful marginal cost/benefit curves likely 
would be difficult or impossible. Such an inquiry is largely, if not wholly, academic, 
however, since any such example must almost by definition present significant 
quantification/monetization problems under Axis 1 as well. Cf. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, 
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 
(2000). 
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FIGURE 6. The relationship between Axes 1 and 2. 
 
Imagine, for example, a CBA, which—as is often the case—provides a 
relatively complete monetization of costs but only a partial monetization of benefits. 
If the (partial) benefits are greater than the (full) costs, one can comfortably55 
conclude that the true benefits also exceed the true costs, even under the “precise 
comparison” test.56 If, on the other hand, the (full) costs are greater than the (partial) 
benefits, it is arguably much harder to reach a conclusion. Unless there is some good 
reason to believe that the unmonetized benefits are trivial, some would argue that 
one cannot reach any conclusion at all about whether the true costs exceed the true 
benefits.57 Others might say that a determination about whether benefits “justify” or 
“outweigh” costs can still be made in such circumstances by considering qualitative 
and quantitative descriptions of the nonmonetized benefits.58 But all would probably 
agree that a precise comparison is impossible. Thus, if a complete-costs-partial-
                                                 
55 This, of course, assumes that one is comfortable with the monetized values assigned 
to begin with. 
56 There are certainly real-world examples of exactly this scenario, especially involving 
Clean Air Act rules affecting particulate matter emissions, a pollutant for which data showing 
adverse human health effects is plentiful. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the 
EPA’s CBA for its 1999 revised particulate matter NAAQS, showing benefits of $58 to $110 
billion and costs of $6 billion). 
57 See Driesen, supra note 8, at 401; Levin, supra note 32, at 230. But see Arden Rowell, 
Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 741 (2012) (arguing that 
where benefits are unquantifiable due to incommensurability, they should simply be 
excluded and CBA conducted using only monetizable costs and benefits: “[T]here is no room 
to allow non-monetizable benefits to affect the outcome of a monetary cost-benefit 
analysis.”). 
58 See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. These are the tests contained in the 
Clinton and Reagan executive orders (respectively) that require(d) agencies to conduct CBA 
of major federal regulations. See infra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. 
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benefits CBA is subjected to a precise comparison, it produces an asymmetry: if the 
monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs, the result is definitive, but if benefits 
fall short of costs, the result is inconclusive.59 This point is illustrated in Figure 7, 
below, by the dotted line labeled “potential failure.” 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Asymmetry resulting when monetized benefits fail to exceed monetized costs.  
 
In such instances, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)60 
encourages agencies to conduct what they call a “break-even” or “threshold” 
analysis.61 This kind of analysis subtracts the partial benefits estimate from the (full) 
costs estimate and then asks the analyst to make an intuitive judgment whether the 
remaining unquantifiable benefits are likely large enough to make up the 
difference.62 This is essentially a less precise apples-to-oranges balancing standard, 
which I have located further to the left on Axis 2.63 
                                                 
59 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 10 (2003) (“When important 
benefits and costs cannot be expressed in monetary units, BCA is less useful, and it can even 
be misleading, because the calculation of net benefits in such cases does not provide a full 
evaluation of all relevant benefits and costs.”). 
60 OIRA is a White House office within the Office of Management and Budget that is 
specifically tasked with administering the requirement in Executive Order 12,866 that 
agencies conduct CBA of major rules. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), 
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012). 
61 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003).  
62 Id. 
63 Cass Sunstein might dispute this characterization. In a recent article, he argues that, 
at least in some circumstances, break-even analysis can be conducted in a more systematic 
and analytically rigorous way. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (critiquing Professor Sunstein’s position); Daniel A. 
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Alternatively, for a CBA that does some amount of quantification or 
monetization of costs and benefits but does not fully monetize (either the second or 
third box from the left on Axis 1), it might be possible to occupy the third box from 
the left on Axis 2—that is, to say whether costs are “wholly disproportionate to 
benefits.”64 A version of CBA commonly used by the EPA under the Clean Water 
Act takes this form. Expressing costs in dollars and benefits in pounds of pollutant 
removed from a factory’s effluent, it asks whether, for example, $100 in costs is 
“wholly disproportionate” to the benefit of removing fifty pounds of phosphorous 
pollution.65 
Where only partial monetization is achieved on Axis 1, any of the less precise 
balancing formulas on the left of Axis 2 (rough balancing, break-even, or wholly 
disproportionate) essentially engage the analyst in an intuitive, apples-to-oranges 
comparison. Even though the EPA and OIRA take the position that this kind of 
balancing can be meaningfully accomplished and courts arguably engage in a similar 
analytic exercise every time they apply the myriad balancing tests that are 
commonplace in the common law, it is not necessarily an uncontroversial concept. 
Some would undoubtedly argue that this kind of apples-to-oranges comparison is 
irrational. How can we know how fifty pounds of phosphorous pollution compares 
to $100? But others would argue that such comparisons can be meaningfully made.66 
Certainly, we would at least want to know a little more about the kind of harm fifty 
pounds of phosphorous might cause, but in many instances the agency probably does 
know more. Let’s say we know that fifty pounds of phosphorous per year will cause 
significant eutrophication of the waterway, thus starving fish and other aquatic 
organisms of oxygen and causing substantial disruption to the existing aquatic 
ecosystem. With enough specificity in the qualitative description of benefits, a 
                                                 
Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 102 CALIF. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (same); Heinzerling, supra note 33 (same). 
64 Particularly if we view the “wholly disproportionate” test as aimed at eliminating 
only the most extreme cases—where a rule seems to eliminate only a de minimis amount of 
pollution but at great cost—then the idea that an apples-to-oranges comparison can be 
meaningfully made under such a test seems plausible.  
65 See infra notes 142 to 143 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman, What Should OIRA Do? Comments on the Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Review, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS (Feb. 24, 
2009), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/D, archived at http://perma.cc 
/9H6H-AEZ6 (“Costs, typically expressed in dollars, can be directly compared to benefits 
expressed in natural, typically non-monetary units such as lives saved, illnesses avoided, and 
environmental resources protected. The comparison is inevitably deliberative—and it is far 
more transparent and comprehensible than a fully monetized cost-benefit calculation.”); 
ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 215 (arguing for qualitative balancing); Rachel Bayefsky, 
Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732, 1735–37 (2014) 
(arguing for an informal variety of CBA that describes certain values that resist monetization, 
like dignity, in purely quantitative terms, but with specificity). 
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meaningful apples-to-oranges comparison may well be possible.67 But it is 
undoubtedly a point on which there is room for debate. 
This example assumes that both costs and benefits are fully described—if not 
in quantitative terms, then in qualitative ones. But what if some (or all) of the 
benefits are simply unknown? What if we know that removing a certain amount of 
dioxin from factory effluents will provide human health benefits in the form of a 
certain number of avoided cancers, but we also suspect that dioxin is an endocrine 
disruptor causing additional health impacts that researchers don’t understand well 
enough to come up with even a ballpark estimate of magnitude? And what if 
researchers simply have not studied the impacts of dioxin on species and ecosystems 
and consequently understand those impacts only dimly, if at all? If some of the 
benefits are unquantifiable because they are unknown, the challenges to conducting 
a meaningful balance are of an entirely different order. Under these conditions, even 
a rough comparison, “wholly disproportionate” test, or break-even analysis may 
become impossible to apply in a meaningful way, although the extent of the problem 
will depend on the specific numbers.68  
                                                 
67 See Bayefsky, supra note 66, at 1750, 1771–81. 
68 Imagine, for example, a CBA in which the costs are fully monetized at $200 million, 
the benefits are only partially monetized at $250 million, and there are additional unknown 
benefits that cannot be described in either quantitative or qualitative terms. Since even the 
partially monetized benefits are bigger than the costs, the analyst could find that this 
regulation passes muster under either an “exceeds” test or a “wholly disproportionate” test. 
If we change the scenario only slightly, so that fully monetized costs are still $200 million, 
but the partial benefits are only $150 million, then the analyst would probably be able to 
conclude that the wholly disproportionate test is met (i.e., that costs are not wholly 
disproportionate to benefits), but would not be able to reach a conclusion under the “exceeds” 
test. If the fully monetized costs are $200 million, but the partially monetized benefits are 
only $500,000, however, it might well be impossible to reach a conclusion under either test. 
These scenarios, involving costs that are fully (or nearly fully) monetized and benefits 
that are only partially monetized, are fairly common (one might even say ubiquitous) in 
environmental law, where benefits relating to human health and species and ecosystems are 
notoriously difficult to quantify and monetize. Clean Air Act regulations frequently fall into 
the first category—with partially monetized benefits significantly outweighing fully 
monetized costs—because a number of health impacts associated with particulate matter 
pollution are relatively well understood and have generated substantial, reliable data. See, 
e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, The Clean Air Interstate Rule, in REFORMING REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 20, 25–28. Regulation of most other kinds of 
environmental harm and pollution, on the other hand, often falls into the second or third 
categories—with partially monetized benefits lower than costs. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK & 
REASON, supra note 2, at 166 (the EPA’s CBA of its 2001 regulation of arsenic in drinking 
water pegged costs at $210 million and benefits at $140 million to $198 million). Regulation 
of ecological harms in particular is likely to fall in the third category. The EPA’s efforts to 
conduct CBA of its regulation of cooling water intake structures at power plants and other 
industrial facilities, for example, which I discuss in Part V.B, is an example of the third 
category, in which partially monetized benefits fall far short of fully monetized costs, making 
a meaningful conclusion under any test impossible. See generally Sinden, supra note 32 
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In fact, significant levels of unknown—as opposed to unquantifiable or 
unmonetizable—benefits arguably take the analysis off the diagram altogether. Even 
the most informal version of CBA depicted in the diagram—the Ben Franklin 
style—assumes that all costs and benefits are known, at least enough to be 
qualitatively described. Franklin envisioned that all of the “pros and cons” could be 
put down in one column or the other on a sheet of paper, such that “the whole lies 
before me.”69 If there are big blank spaces in one or both columns—representing 
unknown costs or benefits of unknown magnitude—then even the kind of rough, 
intuitive comparison that Franklin envisioned becomes very problematic and 
probably impossible.  
Attempting to depict this on the diagram requires extending Axes 1 and 2 even 
further to the left, beyond Ben Franklin CBA: 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Unknown benefits. 
 
Thus, where benefits (or costs) become not just unquantifiable, but unknown 
(incapable of even qualitative description), CBA may fail altogether, which is to say, 
meaningful comparison of costs and benefits becomes impossible.70 
To generalize, then, a move toward informality on Axis 1 (less quantification 
and monetization) will generally require a parallel move toward informality on Axis 
2 (less precision in balancing). The converse is usually true, though not always. A 
move toward informality on Axis 2 is likely to be accompanied by a parallel move 
on Axis 1, though need not be in every case. Moving all the way to the left on Axis 
2 requires some move toward informality on Axis 1 because the left-most positions 
                                                 
(analyzing how often and to what extent the problem of unquantified benefits arise in agency 
CBAs). 
69 GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph 
Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772)). 
70 See Arrow, et al., supra note 3, at 221 (“In some cases . . . benefit-cost analysis cannot 
be used to conclude that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed or fall short of its 
costs, because there is simply too much uncertainty.”). 
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on Axis 2 are simply incompatible with the right-most positions on Axis 1. (How 
can one conduct a rough comparison or break-even analysis of fully monetized 
values?) A move from the right-most end of Axis 2 to the “wholly disproportionate” 
test, on the other hand, would probably allow for a parallel move toward less 
quantification on Axis 1, but would not require it.  
 
3.  The Relationship Between Axes 2 and 3 
 
The second and third axes are also closely related. Figure 9 adds these 
relationships to the diagram. 
 
 
FIGURE 9. The relationship between Axes 2 and 3. 
 
Certainly, if a CBA falls all the way to the left on Axis 3 (costs and benefits are 
measured only for a single alternative), then it is impossible to move all the way to 
the right on Axis 2, that is, to pinpoint the level of regulation at which marginal costs 
are just equal to marginal benefits. Indeed, a CBA in the right-most position on Axis 
2 must also occupy the right-most positions on Axes 1 and 3. It is impossible to 
pinpoint the regulation for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs without 
fully quantifying and expressing in a single metric both costs and benefits (Axis 1) 
and without measuring costs and benefits for a large number of alternatives (Axis 
3). 
Alternatively, a CBA can take a diagonal trajectory starting at the formal end 
of Axis 1, fully quantifying and monetizing all costs and benefits, and ending on the 
informal end of Axis 3 because it only estimates the costs and benefits of a single 
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alternative. Such a CBA would also fall near the middle of Axis 2 (in the third box 
from the right) because it would be able to precisely compare the single alternative’s 
total costs to its total benefits.71 
 
4.  The Different Roles of Formal and Informal CBA  
 
Figure 9 also helps to make salient another important insight about the 
distinction between formal and informal CBA. Economic CBA—by measuring the 
costs and benefits of numerous incrementally different alternatives (Axis 3)—
chooses one perfect option from a whole range of alternatives. Theoretically at least, 
it has the capacity to tell the agency at precisely which level of stringency it should 
set the regulation—that is, to choose the optimally “efficient” level of regulation 
from a whole range of all possible alternatives. On the other hand, any analysis 
located all the way to the left on Axis 3—measuring the costs and benefits of only a 
single alternative—merely provides a binary go-or-no-go answer for a single option.  
Thus, formal and informal CBA perform fundamentally different functions in 
the decisionmaking process. At the formal end of the spectrum, an Economic CBA 
acts as a standard setting tool, telling the agency exactly where to set the regulatory 
standard among a whole range of options.72 A more informal CBA, on the other 
hand (at the middle or left end of the spectrum), acts as a sort of secondary check or 
litmus test on a standard setting decision that has been made by other means.73 Once 
the agency has decided on the basis of some other decisionmaking criterion where 
to set the standard, it can then subject that single option to an informal CBA in order 
to decide whether or not to proceed.74 
This analysis reveals another important insight. While an informal or middle-
of-the-spectrum CBA gives policymakers a vague idea about whether a regulation 
is desirable in comparison to the status quo or moves in the direction of efficiency, 
it has no capacity to tell them—even with perfect information—whether a regulation 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 657, 657 (2010) (defining CBA as a test that is satisfied if the regulation at issue 
“produces benefits (in terms of deaths, injuries, and other losses avoided) greater than the 
cost of compliance”). 
72 See Nathaniel O. Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of the CAIR 
Regulatory Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 33, 
47 (noting that a CBA evaluating only one option “fails to meet the most basic requirement 
of sound economic policy analysis: namely, the consideration of multiple alternatives”). 
73 See Cannon, supra note 9, at 454 (describing informal CBA, what he calls “the weak 
form of CBA,” as a tool for “screen[ing] for irrational outcomes”); Cole, supra note 35, at 
57 (“[CBA] is viewed as a kind of filter designed to capture welfare-reducing proposals, 
while allowing welfare-enhancing proposals to pass through.”). 
74 Keohane, supra note 72, at 47 (“A document that considers the costs and benefits of 
the proposed policy only relative to the status quo cannot possibly have been used to design 
that policy.”). See also Driesen, supra note 47, at 320 (criticizing Professors Jonathan S. 
Masur and Eric A. Posner for confusing these two different functions of CBA). 
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is “efficient” in the welfare economics sense, that is, whether it maximizes overall 
social welfare.75 While it is probably true that a regulation that produces more total 
costs than total benefits is inefficient, the converse is not true. Just because a single 
regulation passes a benefits-exceed-costs test does not necessarily mean that it is 
efficient. 76 Indeed, it may fall far short of efficiency. 
Imagine, for example, that the efficient level of regulation (that would be 
identified by a perfect Economic CBA) would reduce national emissions of some air 
pollutant from forty-eight to fifteen tons per year, would cost society $5 billion per 
year, and would produce $25 billion per year in social benefits, thus producing $20 
billion in net benefits. While this is the only level of regulation that would satisfy a 
formal Economic CBA, many other alternatives could meet the simple benefits-
exceed-costs criterion for a litmus-test CBA. A regulation that reduced emissions by 
just one ton—from forty-eight to forty-seven tons per year—might still produce total 
benefits that significantly outweighed total costs. It might cost $1 billion and 
produce $5 billion in benefits, for example. In that case, it would pass the simple 
benefits-exceed-costs test with flying colors, but it would not be efficient because it 
would not maximize net benefits. It would produce only $4 billion in net benefits, 
compared with the $20 billion produced by the more stringent regulation.77 Thus, a 
                                                 
75 See. BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 13 (distinguishing between the decision 
rule for CBA of a single alternative—go forward if net social benefits are positive—and 
CBA of multiple alternatives, which chooses the alternative with the highest net social 
benefit); RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A 
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 642 (2004) (arguing for 
welfare maximization approach to CBA). 
76 TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 66 
(1984) (observing, with respect to a benefits-exceed-costs test: while this test “guarantee[s] 
that no activity which confers more costs on society than benefits will be undertaken, [it] 
do[es] not guarantee efficiency. . . . [E]fficiency is attained when the marginal value of 
benefits equals the marginal value of costs.”); Keohane, supra note 72, at 49 (“Simply 
calculating total benefits and costs does not shed light on marginal benefits and costs, 
which—as any economics student knows—must be equated to satisfy efficiency.”) An 
informal litmus-test CBA does, by definition, move closer toward the goal of efficiency 
(assuming some accuracy in cost/benefit estimation), but does not necessarily achieve net 
benefits maximization. See supra note 29. 
77 Because of this asymmetry, a simple total-benefits-exceed-total-costs CBA may—
on a fairly reasonable set of assumptions about the shapes of the marginal cost and benefit 
curves—produce what Professor Driesen has called a “one-way ratchet,” tending always to 
push regulation toward less stringency but not in the opposite direction. See Driesen, supra 
note 8, at 380. This is because a regulation that fails a simple litmus-test CBA is usually one 
that is too stringent. A regulation that errs in the other direction, on the other hand—one that 
is too lenient—will likely produce positive net benefits, just less of them than an efficient 
regulation would have produced. Accordingly, a too-lenient regulation will often pass a 
litmus-test CBA, while a too-stringent regulation will fail. See Sinden, supra note 32, at 15 
n.28.  
120 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
CBA that falls on the informal end of Axis 3 (measures only a single alternative) 
provides a very poor proxy for efficiency.  
 
* * * 
 
In sum, we can envision different forms of CBA as falling along a spectrum 
from an informal Ben Franklin CBA to a highly formal Economic CBA. We can 
arrange the various characteristics of formal and informal CBA along three axes that 
describe the level of quantification and monetization, the precision with which costs 
and benefits are compared, and the number of alternatives considered. This typology 
reveals three important insights. First, the three axes are not entirely independent. 
Rather, a move along one axis will often require a parallel move along neighboring 
axes. Second, where some benefits (or costs) are not only unquantifiable but also 
unknown (i.e., cannot be described in even qualitative terms), CBA may fail 
altogether. That is to say, no meaningful comparison under even a rough, imprecise 
Axis 2 formula will be possible. Third, formal and informal CBAs perform 
significantly different functions in decisionmaking. Economic CBA serves as a 
standard setting tool, choosing the efficient level of regulation from all possible 
alternatives. Ben Franklin CBA and other informal varieties, in contrast, act only as 
a litmus test or secondary check on standard setting decisions that have been made 
by other means.  
It is important to be clear about the distinctions and relationships between 
different forms of CBA and about the roles and capacities of each. Unfortunately, 
this kind of clarity has been largely missing from the debate. Instead, scholars and 
policymakers have tended to treat CBA as a monolithic concept. And, as the next 
section shows, to the extent they have made note of these distinctions, they have 
tended to follow an odd pattern: CBA skeptics stress CBA’s formality while 
proponents stress its informality.  
 
III.  FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY IN THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
 
The debate over the role of CBA in evaluating regulation has raged for decades. 
Proponents of CBA promote it as a means of rationalizing agency decisionmaking, 
counteracting the influence of special interests, and increasing transparency.78 
Opponents charge that it fails to adequately account for transcendent and intangible 
values, that it suffers from hopeless limitations on data and scientific 
understandings, and that it obfuscates and obscures relevant issues rather than 
promoting transparency.79  
Often, this debate proceeds in reference simply to “cost-benefit analysis” as a 
generic and undefined, or perhaps presumed-to-be-self-evident, concept. But if we 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 27. 
79 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8–9 (2004). 
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examine the literature with an ear tuned specifically to the variety of forms that CBA 
can take, a peculiar pattern emerges. When proponents do take the time to describe 
or define CBA, they often emphasize its informality. Conversely, when skeptics do 
so, they stress its formality.  
 
A.  CBA Proponents 
 
Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, in the academic writings he published 
before being appointed as President Barack Obama’s “regulatory czar” in charge of 
OIRA, described what he was advocating for as a “modest” form of CBA.80 This 
“modest CBA” probably falls somewhere in the middle of the formality spectrum.81 
With respect to Axis 1, he urged that costs and benefits “should be translated into 
monetary equivalents” wherever possible,82 but he also acknowledged that 
“[q]uantification will be difficult or even impossible in some cases,” and that in such 
cases, effects should be described in qualitative terms.83 With respect to Axis 2, his 
balancing formula is also in the middle of the spectrum: “[A]n agency should be 
required to conclude, in ordinary circumstances, that the benefits [of a regulation] 
justify the costs.”84 For him, the “justify” formulation “ordinarily” requires a 
showing that the monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs, but exceptions are 
allowed where the agency can “explain” that it is an “unusual” case involving, for 
                                                 
80 Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the 
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 253 (1996).  
81 Indeed, Sunstein’s form of CBA is apparently hard to pigeonhole. Commenters seem 
to disagree about whether his preferred variety of CBA is “softer” or “stronger.” Compare 
Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1998) (calling what 
Sunstein promoted a “‘soft’ version” of CBA), and FARBER, supra note 9, at 93 (same), with 
Cannon, supra note 9, at 429 (identifying Sunstein as a proponent of what he calls the 
“strong” (i.e., more formal) form of CBA). This difference in view may perhaps simply 
reflect the fact that Sunstein’s views have changed over time. See infra note 87. 
82 SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 20. 
83 Id. at 21; see also SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 111 (“The quantitative 
description should supplement rather than displace a qualitative description of relevant 
effects.”). 
84 SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 21. The “justify” formulation for 
balancing costs and benefits is the one that appears in the current executive orders requiring 
agencies to conduct CBA of major federal regulations, though an earlier executive order put 
in place by President Reagan in 1981 originally required benefits to “outweigh” costs. See 
infra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. 
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example, risks to young children.85 With respect to Axis 3, he was not explicit, but 
appeared to envision evaluation of a single alternative.86  
The important point here is that in describing his “modest” brand of CBA, 
Professor Sunstein went to great pains to emphasize its informality and flexibility:  
 
None of this suggests that the government should be rigidly bound by 
the “bottom line.” Cost-benefit analysis ought not to place agencies in an 
arithmetic straightjacket. The benefits should ordinarily be required to 
exceed the costs, but regulators might reasonably decide that the numbers 
are not decisive if, for example, children are mostly at risk, or if the 
relevant hazard is faced mostly by poor people, or if the hazard at issue is 
involuntarily incurred or extremely difficult to control.87 
 
Similarly, John Graham, former administrator of OIRA under President George 
W. Bush, has distinguished between “soft” and “hard” CBA in his academic 
writings, advocating for use of the “soft” version.88 Like Professor Sunstein’s 
“modest” CBA, Graham’s “soft” CBA does not require full quantification or 
monetization and does not require a precise balancing of costs and benefits: “[A] 
nonefficiency claim (e.g., a fairness concern or equity consideration) can contribute 
to a determination that the benefits of a rule do, or do not, justify the costs.”89 Thus, 
                                                 
85 Id. Professor Sunstein also suggested that, at least when courts review whether a 
regulation meets a cost-benefit test, the balancing formula should be relatively imprecise and 
informal: “[C]osts [should] not be grossly disproportionate to benefits,” a balancing standard 
well toward the informal end of Axis 2. SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 120. 
86 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 21 (“If, for example, a 
regulation is expected to save 80 lives, each valued at $6 million, and if it would cost $200 
million, it is fully justified.”). 
87 Id. at 22; accord SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 106–07; see also 
Jonathan B. Wiener, Best Cass Scenario, 43 TULSA L. REV. 933, 934 n.13 (2008) 
(“Sunstein’s cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis . . . harkens back to Benjamin 
Franklin’s ‘prudential algebra’ for making considered decisions that weigh the pros and cons 
. . . .”). But see Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1726–28 (2002) (criticizing Professor Sunstein for allowing regulators 
to allow nonquantified factors to sometimes trump the numerical results of CBA and for 
allowing rights and irreversibility to trump). In his recent writings since stepping down as 
OIRA director, Professor Sunstein appears to have backed away some from this embrace of 
informality, stressing instead the importance of quantification and monetization and 
maximizing net benefits. See infra notes 310–313 and accompanying text. 
88 Graham, supra note 2, at 432–38. Even Graham’s “hard” CBA does not meet all the 
requirements for Economic CBA, because it imposes only a litmus-test CBA, rather than 
identifying the point at which marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 
89 Id. at 433; see also Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under 
Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97, 101 (1987) (distinguishing between CBA in the 
“narrow sense” and a broader form and endorsing the broader form: “What I mean by cost-
benefit analysis is simply a weighing of all the desirable effects of a proposed action against 
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both Professor Sunstein and Professor Graham recognize that there may be multiple 
forms of CBA but explicitly endorse a more informal variety.  
Alternatively, some proponents of CBA blur the line between formal and 
informal CBA and thus appropriate some of the universal appeal of Ben Franklin to 
the project of advocating for more formal CBA. Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C. 
Circuit, for example, long a proponent of formal CBA in agency decisionmaking,90 
has, in both his opinions and his academic writings, argued for CBA’s rationality by 
equating it with Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra.91 Many others have done the 
same. Here’s one example: 
 
An analytical technique explicitly relied upon by Benjamin Franklin and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, cost-benefit analysis is as old as rational thought. 
All deliberative decisions involve a weighing of the advantages (benefits) 
and disadvantages (costs) of a contemplated course of action.92  
 
And here’s another: 
 
While the Constitution does not mandate cost-benefit analysis, such a 
mode of thinking was not unknown to the Framers. Benjamin Franklin 
recommended that individuals consider courses of action by writing down 
all their advantages and disadvantages . . . .93 
 
By invoking Ben Franklin, either explicitly or implicitly, these authors present 
CBA as “the soul of rationality” and common sense.94 Kip Viscusi, an economist 
and prominent proponent of formal CBA, calls CBA “straightforward” and 
“intuitively appealing” and suggests that the only alternative is for regulators to 
                                                 
all the undesirable effects, whether or not they are susceptible of being expressed in 
economic terms.”).  
90 See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For a 
discussion of this case, see infra notes 201–208 and accompanying text. 
91 Stephen F. Williams, Cost-Benefit Analysis Colloquy: Squaring the Vicious Circle, 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 270 (2001) (“[I]f you accept the basic Ben Franklin preference for 
net benefit, then you must in some way consider costs and compare them with benefits; that’s 
the only way you can get to net benefit.”); Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1319–21 (invoking Ben 
Franklin: “‘Reasonableness’ has long been associated with the balancing of costs and 
benefits. . . . [C]ost-benefit analysis entails only a systematic weighing of pros and cons, or 
what Benjamin Franklin referred to as a ‘moral or prudential algebra.’”). 
92 David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 291, 310 (2008) (citations omitted). 
93 John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 
901, 940 n.177 (2001) (defending CBA of federal regulations as required in Executive Order 
12,866); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 123, 123–24 
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013) (equating CBA with Ben Franklin’s 
“prudential algebra”). 
94 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 35.  
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“abandon rational thought about policy impacts and rely on their instincts.”95 
Professors Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore claim that “the use of cost-
benefit analysis is a requirement of basic rationality”96 and warn that the only other 
choice is to “abandon reasoned analysis” and descend into “gut-level 
decisionmaking.”97 Professor Sunstein uses similar terms in arguing for his more 
“modest” form of CBA, telling us “the antonym to regulation guided by cost-benefit 
analysis is . . . regulation that amounts to a stab in the dark.”98 
This kind of rhetoric was particularly evident in the briefing before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Riverkeeper, a case that brought the issue of CBA in 
environmental rulemaking before the Court in 2009.99 Industry associations, the 
federal government, and their supporting amici, argued in favor of the EPA’s use of 
CBA and portrayed CBA as informal and casual. In some instances they avoided the 
term “cost-benefit analysis” altogether, referring instead to “a comparison of costs 
and benefits” or a consideration of the relationship “between costs and benefits.”100 
                                                 
95 W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436, 1439 
(1996). 
96 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 12; see also Shi-Ling Hsu, On the Role of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law: A Book Review of Frank Ackerman & Lisa 
Heinzerling’s Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything & the Value of Nothing, 35 
ENVTL. L. 135, 137–38 (2005) (“[A]ll would agree that [CBA] is a way of introducing some 
rationality into [the] legislative and regulatory process . . . .”); Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1319–
21 (“‘Reasonableness’ has long been associated with the balancing of costs and benefits.”); 
Shabman & Stephenson, supra note 46, at 382 (“Benefit-cost analysis has been defended as 
a universal stance of rationality . . . .”). 
97 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 3; see also id. at 4 (stating that rejecting CBA 
is equivalent to “rejecting reason”); id. at 16 (stating CBA brings “increased rationality to 
federal regulation”). Indeed, the title of Professors Revesz’s and Livermore’s book, Retaking 
Rationality, which argues that progressives should embrace CBA, essentially equates CBA 
with rationality. 
98 SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 107; see also THEODORE M. PORTER, 
TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 119 (1995) 
(“A favorite rhetoric surrounding the measurement of benefits and costs naturalizes it as the 
form of analysis spontaneously used by rational economic actors.”). But see GRAMLICH, 
supra note 1, at 5 (stating that the idea “that [CBA] is a mechanical substitute for common 
sense” is a “common misconception[]” and that “[n]othing could be further from the truth”).  
A number of CBA supporters also try to soften its edges by presenting it as a decision 
“procedure” that provides information to decision makers, but does not necessarily dictate 
outcomes. See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1498; see also ADLER & POSNER, 
supra note 17, at 62–100; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 138 
(1997); REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 15 (CBA should be only one of several inputs 
into public policy); Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221–22; see also Rowell, supra note 57, at 
741 (“It is by no means obvious that cost-benefit analysis should be the sole determinant of 
legal policy. . . .”).  
99 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). 
100 See Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp. at 39, 55, Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 
07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2753247, at *39, *55; Brief for the AEI Center for 
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The Justice Department’s brief equated the EPA’s use of CBA with common sense, 
rationality,101 and reasonableness,102 calling what agencies do “conceptually 
similar” to the common sense weighing of costs and benefits that individuals do,103 
which is common “in human experience generally.”104 Entergy Corporation’s brief 
called CBA “nothing more than common sense—the imperative of basic rationality 
to ensure that actions do more good than harm.”105 
And, of course, there was the inevitable appeal to Ben Franklin. The amicus 
brief filed by the American Enterprise Institute on behalf of a group of economists 
supporting the EPA’s use of CBA opened its argument section this way: “The 
general concept of comparing benefits and costs is familiar and long standing. 
Indeed, in 1772, Benjamin Franklin wrote in a letter about a method for making 
private decisions . . . that illustrates the basic features of benefit-cost 
assessments.”106 That brief never used the term “cost-benefit analysis” at all—
preferring the more innocuous term “benefit-cost comparisons.”107 Additionally, it 
emphasized the fact that “[n]ot all impacts of a decision can be quantified or 
expressed in dollar terms” and that CBA should “give due consideration to factors 
that defy quantification but are thought to be important.”108 
There are also plenty of counterexamples—proponents of CBA who advocate 
a highly formal brand of CBA.109 Many of these counterexamples come from the 
                                                 
Regulatory and Market Studies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners passim, 
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2817679 [hereinafter 
Brief for the AEI Center]. 
101 Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 4 (describing CBA as 
“further[ing] rational decisionmaking”); Brief for the AEI Center, supra note 100, at 6. 
102 Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 30 (“[A]ny reasonable 
judgment will ordinarily be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits . . . .”) 
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1694 
(2001)). 
103 Brief for the Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 14, 
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2753248 at *14. 
104 Id. at 13–14 (“In everyday life, people routinely weigh costs against benefits in 
deciding whether to do something.”). 
105 Brief for Petitioner Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 29. Indeed, Entergy argued 
that “cost-benefit analysis is always reasonable. Cost-benefit analysis (and particularly the 
modest form employed by EPA here) is essentially just another way of describing common 
sense or basic rationality.” Id. at 56; see Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin, 
and the Supreme Court, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1175, 1185 (2014). 
106 Brief for the AEI Center, supra note 100, at 6. 
107 See id. passim. 
108 Id. at 12–13. 
109 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Law and 
Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23888 
83, archived at http://perma.cc/QD47-3S27 (“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the basis for formal 
cost-benefit analysis.”); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 
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economics literature.110 For example, there have been a number of studies in recent 
years by economists purporting to measure the quality of agency CBAs. These 
studies employ criteria that essentially assume a good CBA equals a formal CBA.111 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting the significant strand of pro-CBA scholarship—much 
of it from some of CBA’s most prominent advocates—that emphasizes instead the 
informality of CBA. 
 
B.  CBA Skeptics 
 
On the other hand, those who attack CBA, to the extent they define it at all, 
tend to stress its formality. Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling 
criticize what they refer to as “formal cost-benefit analysis”112 and “narrow 
                                                 
U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (1998) (defining the procedure of CBA in terms that put it at 
the most formal end of the spectrum—requiring full quantification in a common metric of 
costs and benefits of multiple options in order to identify the point of net benefits 
maximization—though arguing against a normative grounding in Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); 
Rowell, supra note 57, at 723 (arguing that CBA should not include nonmonetized benefits); 
Cole, supra note 35, at 59 (defining CBA in terms of net benefit maximization). 
110 See, e.g., Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221–22 (arguing that CBA should identify 
the point at which “the incremental benefits from regulation are just offset by the incremental 
costs,” that “[b]enefits and costs . . . should be quantified wherever possible . . . [and] [i]n 
most instances, it should be possible to describe the effects of proposed policy changes in 
quantitative terms,” and that “[f]ormal benefit-cost analysis . . . can greatly improve the 
process and, hence, the outcome of policy analysis”). 
111 See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: 
Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 197 (2012) (using 
a set of indicators developed by OIRA as criteria for good CBA, including 
quantification/monetization of costs and benefits, analysis of alternatives, and discounting); 
Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008, 
32 RISK ANALYSIS 855, 856, 859 (2012) (evaluating quality of CBAs of “economically 
significant” rules reviewed by OIRA in 2008 using “evaluation criteria . . . drawn from 
Executive Order 12866 and [OMB] Circular A-4,” including “[d]id the agency maximize net 
benefits”?); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved 
Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 67, 72 (2008) (using OMB guidelines and 
Arrow et al., supra note 3, as a benchmark for good CBA); Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. 
Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 192, 197 (2007) (using Executive Order 12,866 and OMB guidance as a 
benchmark, including requirements of quantification “to the fullest extent possible,” 
assessment of “all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,” and “selecting the 
regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits” (citations omitted)). Similarly, in the 
political realm, formality in CBA is sometimes equated with “rigor.” See Robert P. Bartlett, 
III, The Institutional Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale 
of Four Paradigms 9 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus., and Econ., 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488077, archived at 
http://perma.cc/55LJ-G3H5. 
112 ACKERMAN AND HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 9. 
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economic analysis,”113 decrying CBA’s “atomistic and reductionist approach.”114 
Professor Doug Kysar describes CBA as grounded in the economic concept of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and “select[ing] the point of marginal equivalence between 
social costs and benefits.”115 Professor David Driesen describes CBA as fully 
quantified and monetized—it “consists of estimates of the regulation’s costs and of 
the monetary value economists associate with the harms the regulation will 
avoid.”116  
Indeed, much of opponents’ criticism of CBA centers on the quantification and 
monetization of costs and benefits. They argue that certain values, like human lives 
or endangered species, are simply incommensurable with money and therefore 
simply cannot—or should not—be shoehorned into a monetary metric.117 They 
argue that quantification is simply impossible as a practical matter because of gross 
inadequacies in data and scientific understandings of things like the health effects of 
toxic chemicals or the impacts of rising temperatures on ecosystems. They argue 
that expressing everything in dollar terms devalues the preferences of the poor 
because each dollar is worth more to a poor person than a rich person.118 They argue 
that using a discount rate to convert monetary values representing future benefits 
into present net values devalues the lives of future generations in ways that breach 
fundamental ethical norms.119 All of these problems only arise when the analyst tries 
to quantify costs and benefits and translate them into a monetary metric—one of the 
hallmarks of formal CBA.  
Indeed, many of CBA’s harshest critics don’t object to informal Ben Franklin 
CBA at all. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder, longtime 
opponents of CBA, actually invoke Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra themselves as 
a model for their proposed alternative to (formal) CBA.120 Professors Ackerman and 
                                                 
113 Id. at 8. 
114 Id. at 211. 
115 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 104 (2010); see also Sinden, Defense of Absolutes, supra note 
2, at 1413–23 (tracing the development of CBA over the course of the twentieth century, 
from limited pragmatic method used by the Army Corps of Engineers, to analyzing the 
construction costs and electricity production benefits of dams, to the highly theorized, 
extensively elaborated branch of welfare economics that attempts to quantify and monetize 
all social values related to policies). 
116 Driesen, supra note 8, at 339. 
117 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 7–9, 211–12.  
118 Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401–07 (1981). 
119 Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive 
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 580 (2004); see Revesz, supra note 34, at 
988–1006; Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 40–41. 
120 Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 2, at 497 (stating that their alternative “more 
closely resembles Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra than the reductive rationality attempted 
by CBA”). 
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Heinzerling similarly endorse an informal balancing of costs and benefits and 
distinguish it from the formal CBA that they criticize: 
 
[A]nalysis of costs and benefits, in lowercase letters, is an essential part of 
any systematic thought about public policy, and has always been involved 
in government decision making. Our criticism concerns the much 
narrower doctrine of Cost-Benefit Analysis, which calls for a specific, 
controversial way of expressing and thinking about costs and benefits.121 
 
I have also previously argued in favor of “limited cost-benefit analysis”—a 
rough apples-to-oranges balancing that is one of a series of “short-cut standards” 
that Congress adopted in the environmental legislation of the 1970s in order to avoid 
the problems and pitfalls associated with formal CBA.122 Professor Alexander 
Volokh, who criticizes CBA from a libertarian perspective, takes a similar view, 
noting that “[f]ormal cost-benefit analysis—which is just one of many possible 
implementations of cost-benefit analysis—is much more controversial, and its 
theoretical basis is much less defensible than the intuitive kind we do all the time.”123 
 
* * * 
 
Two things seem to be going on here. First, a number of prominent authors and 
policymakers who advocate CBA promote a more informal version—or at least a 
middle-of-the-spectrum CBA—while a number of the most prominent skeptics do 
not object to the most informal forms of CBA. This suggests that, if there is any 
room for agreement, it is more likely to be found at the informal end of the spectrum, 
while formal versions of CBA remain highly controversial.124 To the extent this is 
                                                 
121 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 211 (citations omitted). 
122 Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 184–192; see also Wendy E. Wagner, 
The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed up as Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 56, 76–77 (arguing, in the context of the EPA’s 2005 
Clean Air Interstate Rule, for an informal CBA—or “mixed quantitative-qualitative” CBA—
that would have “list[ed] the aggregated costs . . . on one side compared against the 
significant quantified and unquantified (but not monetized) benefits, presented on the other 
side”). 
123 Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011); see also FARBER, supra note 9, at 
93, 114–23 (advocating a hybrid scheme that uses a “soft CBA” as a kind of backstop to a 
feasibility analysis); ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 215 (acknowledging that “any rational 
evaluation of policies must take account of their costs and benefits,” but arguing that “these 
facts are best presented qualitatively” and “in disaggregated form,” and that “[t]he 
willingness-to-pay measure of value must be rejected”). 
124 See Cannon, supra note 9, at 455 (noting that informal CBA—what he calls “the 
weak form of CBA”—has “broad intuitive appeal” and “does not provoke the level of 
resistance or skepticism that currently attaches to the strong form of CBA”).  
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true, one might expect to see agencies inclined to move toward less formal versions 
of CBA in order to avoid controversy—at least to the extent allowed by Congress 
and the courts.  
Second, some CBA proponents appear to invoke Ben Franklin and his mantle 
of rationality and common sense in arguing for more formal modes of CBA. The 
analysis in Part II pointing out the important distinctions between formal and 
informal CBA suggests that this kind of argument is inappropriate and serves to 
muddy the debate. I will examine this point more closely in Part VI. 
Having examined the academic debate through the lens of formality and 
informality, the next order of business is to look at the law through the same lens. 
To what extent have Congress and federal courts cabined agency discretion with 
respect to where along the formality-informality spectrum their CBAs lie?  
 
IV.  CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: THE TREND TOWARD INFORMALITY 
 
Congress has in most instances actually rejected CBA as a decisionmaking 
rubric for environmental health and safety regulation, directing agencies to instead 
use feasibility or health-based standards. And the courts have largely upheld that 
approach, in some instances going so far as to adopt a default rule disfavoring the 
use of CBA. In those instances where Congress and the courts have endorsed or 
allowed agency use of CBA, however, it has usually been of a fairly informal variety. 
There have been a few notable departures from this pattern in some circuit courts 
starting in the early 1990s, which, several years ago, might have been read to signal 
an incipient trend toward formality in the courts. But the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 
decision in Riverkeeper, endorsing informality and expressing considerable 
skepticism about more formal varieties of CBA, certainly bucked, and perhaps 
weakened, any such trend.  
 
A.  Congress 
 
In the 1970s, when most of our federal environmental laws were passed, 
Congress was highly skeptical of CBA.125 Members of Congress worried that 
pervasive scientific uncertainties and the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
monetize intangible values would make any meaningful quantification and 
comparison of costs and benefits impossible.126 They worried that agencies would 
spin their wheels and spend vast resources chasing the holy grail of the accurate, 
uncontestable, and determinate CBA, and produce instead only regulatory 
                                                 
125 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 363–64 (4th ed. 2003); SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., FEDERAL REGULATION AND 
REGULATORY REFORM 510–15 (Comm. Print 1976). 
126 See Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 184–85. 
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paralysis.127 Accordingly, in crafting our major environmental statutes, Congress in 
almost every instance128 rejected CBA.129 Instead, Congress directed agencies to set 
standards via either feasibility criteria,130 which limit environmental degradation to 
                                                 
127 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1283–
84 (1985). 
128 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1972 
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012), the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–97 (2012), and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 
(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (2012), are the only prominent exceptions. FIFRA and 
the TSCA have been called “two of the least successful statutes of the environmental 
decade.” Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343 
(2002). The cost-benefit criterion has arguably made them unwieldy and difficult to 
administer, producing exactly the kind of regulatory paralysis that Congress worried about 
in other contexts. Id. Indeed, since the Fifth Circuit’s 1991 decision overturning the EPA’s 
asbestos ban on the ground that its CBA was inadequate, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 
947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991), discussed infra notes 183 to 192 and accompanying 
text, TSCA has come to a grinding halt. The EPA has yet to ban a single chemical under 
TSCA. 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 16:3–16:4 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. 
eds., 2011). 
129 See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 32 (2003); Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, 
Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental 
Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160–61 (1983); Sinden, Endangered Species, 
supra note 2, at 184–92, 197–210; Lynn E. Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of 
Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequences for Environmental Policymaking, 2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 238–40. 
130 Feasibility standards—also known as technology-based standards—are common in 
American environmental law. See generally David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that the 
feasibility principle offers a rational alternative to CBA); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph 
of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 86 (defending technology-based 
standards as “one of the most important innovations in U.S. environmental law”); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based 
Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (critiquing Professor Sunstein’s arguments for the use of 
CBA instead of technology-based standards). 
Feasibility criteria are distinct from cost-benefit analysis because they do not require a 
comparison of costs to benefits. See Winston Harrington, The Cooling Water Intake 
Structures Rule, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 160, 161. 
Once an agency (or Congress) determines that the benefits of regulation exceed some 
threshold, the feasibility principle directs the agency to make the standard as stringent as 
technologically possible without imposing costs that cannot be reasonably borne by the 
industry.  
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the lowest level economically and technically feasible, or health-based criteria,131 
which look only at impacts on human or ecological health and prohibit any 
consideration of costs.132  
In the few instances in which Congress has authorized agency use of CBA in 
setting environmental standards, it has not been particularly clear about the level of 
formality it intends the agencies to use. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), for example, 
are both frequently cited as the classic cost-benefit balancing statutes.133 Yet neither 
one ever uses the term “cost-benefit analysis,” or even “cost-benefit balancing.” 
Instead, they simply direct the EPA to apply a “reasonableness” criterion in setting 
standards.134 The courts have inferred that determining whether a standard is 
“reasonable” requires some comparison of costs and benefits.135 But Congress has 
certainly not made clear how formal that analysis needs to be.  
Some pieces of the legislative history of TSCA indicate that Congress intended 
only a relatively informal analysis and was somewhat wary of formal CBA. The 
House committee report expressed Axis 1 reservations, noting that a “formal benefit-
cost analysis . . . would not be very useful” given the difficulties of assigning 
monetary values to the costs and benefits of chemical regulation.136 The Senate 
                                                 
131 Two prominent examples are the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531–44 
(2012), and the provision for the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
132 See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based 
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (identifying CBA, health-
based standards, and feasibility standards as the “three principal approaches for determining 
the stringency of environmental protection”). 
133 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 125, at 455–59. 
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to regulate toxic chemicals 
that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); id. § 
2605(c)(1)(D) (directing the EPA to assess the economic benefits of the chemical to society 
and the “economic consequences” of the regulation in order to evaluate the unreasonableness 
of a risk); 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2012) (directing the EPA to deny registration to any pesticide 
that poses an “unreasonable risk to man or the environment”). 
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2012), uses 
similar language, authorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to promulgate rules 
“reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury.” Id. § 
2058(f)(3)(A). The CPSA also requires the Commission to publish a “description of the 
potential benefits and potential costs of the proposed rule, including any benefits or costs 
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms,” id. § 2058(c)(1), and the costs and benefits of 
“any reasonable alternatives,” id. § 2058(c)(4), and to make a finding that “the benefits 
expected from the rule bear a reasonable relationship to its costs,” id. § 2058(f)(3)(E). As 
discussed in more detail below, courts have interpreted this language to require only informal 
CBA. See infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.  
135 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991). 
136 COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 14 (1976). 
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committee report expressed concerns about Axis 2 as well, stating “[i]n comparing 
risks, costs, and benefits, . . . it is important to recognize that one is weighing 
noncommensurates, and it is not feasible to reach a decision just on the basis of 
quantitative comparisons.”137 Despite these statements, a landmark Fifth Circuit 
opinion—discussed more fully in the next section—took a very different view, 
striking down the EPA’s asbestos ban under TSCA for employing an insufficiently 
formal version of CBA.138 
The legislative history of FIFRA contains evidence that Congress may have 
had in mind a less formal CBA under that statute as well. FIFRA requires the EPA 
to deny registration to any pesticide that will cause “any unreasonable risk to man 
or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental 
costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.”139 The Senate Commerce Committee 
created this standard and stated that it thereby “intended that any adverse effect 
ought not to be tolerated unless there are overriding benefits from the use of a 
pesticide.”140 This language could be construed to suggest a version of the “wholly 
disproportionate” test and, thus, a CBA situated well toward the informal end of 
Axis 2.141 
Similarly, in directing the EPA to set the first interim set of standards for 
pollution discharges under the Clean Water Act, Congress called for CBA but 
seemed to contemplate a relatively informal version. The statute directed the EPA 
to consider “the total cost [imposed on industry by the standards] . . . in relation to 
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved.”142 Senator Edmund Muskie, the 
principal sponsor of the Act in the Senate, described this as a “limited balancing 
                                                 
137 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, S. REP. NO. 94-698, 
at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503 (indicating an expectation that the 
EPA give “full consideration” to the “burdens of human suffering and premature death”); 
see also id. at 8, 10, 20, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4498, 4500, 4510 (emphasizing statutory 
language at 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(D) that limits the EPA’s consideration to those 
“economic consequences” that are “reasonably ascertainable”); id. at 82, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4532 (noting that language in TSCA requiring consideration of economic impacts was 
included “in lieu of proposals [that would have provided for] the mandatory preparation of 
detailed economic impact statements”). 
138 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30. 
139 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).  
140 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PESTICIDE CONTROL ACT OF 
1972, S. REP. NO. 92-970, at 11 (1972); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 451 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the Senate Commerce Committee was “environmentally 
inclined” and that this “language was perceived as tightening criteria for registration” above 
the looser language that had been adopted in the House bill). 
141 See Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-
pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 
177 (2006); see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 129, at 39 (characterizing FIFRA 
as containing an “open-ended balancing standard”). 
142 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012); see also § 1311(b)(1)(A) (requiring adoption of 
the “best practicable control technology currently available”). 
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test” that was only intended to affect the standard “where the additional degree of 
effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs.”143 This is the standard 
used as an example in Part II above. It is situated well toward the informality end of 
the spectrum along all three axes. And, as the next section explains, the case law has 
read this provision consistently with this legislative history as requiring only an 
informal CBA.  
The only exception is the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as amended in 
1996, but even there Congress did not appear to contemplate the most formal version 
of CBA. In setting maximum contaminant levels for sources of drinking water, the 
SDWA requires the EPA to assess the “[q]uantifiable and nonquantifiable” costs and 
benefits associated with each alternative being considered.144 Here, then, unlike the 
other statutes, Congress made specific reference to costs, benefits, and 
quantification. The statute also uses language that appears to reference economic 
theory, specifically giving the EPA authority to “identify valid approaches for the 
measurement and valuation of benefits . . . including . . . consumer willingness to 
pay for reductions in health risks from drinking water contaminants.”145 But the 
statute stops short of actually requiring the EPA to base its decision on CBA. Indeed, 
the statute actually directs the EPA to set the maximum contaminant level in the first 
instance on the basis of a feasibility standard.146 It then gives the EPA the discretion, 
if it so chooses, to override the results of the feasibility analysis and adjust the level 
on the basis that “the benefits of a maximum contaminant level . . . would not justify 
the costs . . . .”147 Thus, while the SDWA arguably authorizes a more formal variety 
of CBA, it does not require the EPA to actually base its decision on that CBA. 
                                                 
143 ENVTL. POL’Y DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93RD CONG., A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 170, 1466 
(Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] 
(“The Committee recognizes that no mathematical balance can be achieved in considering 
relative costs and benefits nor would any precise formula be desirable . . . .”). 
144 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (2012).  
145 Id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(iii); see also id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(IV) (requiring the EPA 
to publish an analysis of “[t]he incremental costs and benefits associated with each 
alternative maximum contaminant level considered”). 
146 The statute first directs the EPA to set something called a “maximum contaminant 
level goal.” Id. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A). This goal is to be set according to a very stringent health 
based standard—that is, “at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the 
health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety.” Id. § 300g-
1(b)(4)(A). It then directs the EPA to set the “maximum contaminant level,” which is the 
limit that drinking water supplies are actually required to meet, “as close to the maximum 
contaminant level goal as is feasible.” Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). 
147 Id. § 300g-1(b)(6)(A). This provision goes on to say that where the costs of the 
chosen maximum contaminant level do not justify the benefits, the EPA “may . . . promulgate 
a maximum contaminant level . . . that maximizes health risk reduction benefits at a cost that 
is justified by the benefits.” Id. While this language might appear at first glance to be a 
reference to net benefits maximization (economic efficiency), it actually calls for something 
quite different and represents a departure from economic theory. It directs the EPA to set the 
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In sum, Congress has for the most part eschewed CBA in crafting our federal 
environmental statutes. In those few instances when it has directed agencies to use 
CBA, it has—with limited exceptions—directed them to use only informal varieties 
of CBA.148 
 
B.  The Courts 
 
In interpreting the federal environmental statutes, a number of federal court 
decisions have largely confirmed Congress’s apparent antipathy toward CBA.149 
                                                 
standard at the level at which overall benefits are as high as they can possibly be, as long as 
they are cost justified. This could well be a point more stringent than the point of net benefits 
maximization. In Figure 2, for example, this would be the point furthest to the right (“most 
stringent” regulation). See supra fig. 2.  
The D.C. Circuit also noted in City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 710–11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007), that while the SDWA requires the EPA to perform a CBA, the use of that CBA 
to set the maximum contaminant level is discretionary. That case actually involved an 
exception the statute carves out for cryptosporidium, which prohibits the EPA from using 
the CBA override to set the maximum contaminant level for this contaminant. 42 U.S.C. § 
300g-1(b)(6)(C). Congress was particularly concerned about cryptosporidium at the time, 
due to a high profile and disastrous outbreak in Milwaukee three years earlier. City of 
Portland, 507 F.3d at 710–11. 
148 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)—not itself an environmental statute, 
but one that applies to rulemaking under the environmental statutes—conforms with this 
trend. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–71 (2012). The UMRA, passed in 1994 as part of the 
104th Congress’s “contract with America,” requires agencies to prepare CBAs of major 
rules. See Victor B. Flatt, Environmental “Contraction” for America? (or How I Stopped 
Worrying and Learned to Love the EPA), 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 585, 588 n.7 (1996). But 
nothing in the statutory text indicates that the CBA must be particularly formal. It simply 
requires a “written statement containing . . . a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the 
anticipated costs and benefits.” 2 U.S.C. §1532(a). 
In the National Environmental Policy Act, Congress also expressed concern with the 
potential shortcomings of formal modes of analysis. In the same section of the statute that 
requires federal agencies to conduct environmental impact statements where their actions 
involve significant environmental effects, Congress directed all federal agencies to “identify 
and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in 
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) 
(2012). The regulations interpreting that provision explicitly discourage formal CBA: “[T]he 
weighing of the merits and drawbacks of various alternatives need not be displayed in a 
monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when there are important qualitative 
considerations. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2014). 
149 In his 2002 book, The Cost-Benefit State, Professor Sunstein attempted to make the 
opposite argument, contending that the federal courts were moving toward adopting a default 
rule in favor of cost-benefit analysis. See SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 
19–20. But see Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004).  
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The U.S. Supreme Court has on three occasions held particular provisions of 
environmental statutes to preclude CBA, and on two of those occasions has done so 
on the basis of an anti-CBA presumption, stating that unless the statute is clear, it 
should be presumed to preclude CBA.150 More recently, in Riverkeeper, the Court 
                                                 
150 In Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470–71 (2001), the Court held 
that the text of the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars” the EPA from using CBA to set the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In so doing, the Court applied an anti-CBA 
presumption, holding that in the absence of a “clear” “textual commitment” to CBA, the 
statute must be read as precluding CBA. See id. at 490 (Breyer, J. concurring) (reading 
majority opinion as applying a “presumption that any authority . . . to consider costs must 
flow from a ‘textual commitment’ that is ‘clear’” (quoting id. at 468 (majority opinion)). In 
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981), the Court held that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act directs OSHA to set workplace health standards for 
toxics on the basis of a feasibility test rather than CBA and indicated that this was based on 
a general presumption against CBA: “When Congress has intended that an agency engage in 
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” Finally, 
in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978), the Court held that the 
Endangered Species Act imposes absolute requirements on federal agencies and precludes 
cost-benefit balancing: “The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and 
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” Id. at 184. This meant that 
“in this case [the fact that] the burden on the public through the loss of millions of 
unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter” was not a reason 
to relieve the Tennessee Valley Authority from its obligation under the Act to halt 
completion of a $100 million dam in order to preserve the species. Id. at 187.  
Similarly, a line of cases in the federal courts of appeals has held that CBA is not 
required in setting most of the feasibility standards under the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., 
Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In applying the BAT 
standard, the EPA is not obligated to evaluate the reasonableness of the relationship between 
costs and benefits. . . . Indeed, the EPA may prescribe [effluent limitations guidelines] whose 
costs are significantly disproportionate to their benefits, just as long as the BAT 
determination remains economically feasible for the industry as a whole.” (citations 
omitted)); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A] direct 
cost/benefit correlation is not required [for BAT], so even minimal environmental impact 
can be regulated, so long as the prescribed alternative is technologically and economically 
achievable.” (citations omitted)); Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 565 (4th Cir. 
1985) (holding that CBA is not required for setting BAT, NSPS, PSES and PSNS standards); 
Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 n.64 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“[Under 
BAT], cost is no longer considered in comparison to effluent reduction benefits. Instead, the 
Administrator looks only at the cost of achieving the requisite effluent reduction.” (citations 
omitted)); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(distinguishing BAT from BPT standard stating that a limited cost-benefit balancing is 
required under the latter but not under the former); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 
1341–42 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that CBA is not required in setting NSPS); Am. Paper Inst. 
v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding CBA not required in setting BAT); see 
also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 70–71 & n.10 (1980) (noting in dicta 
that the Clean Water Act directs the EPA not to consider costs in relation to benefits in setting 
effluent limits under the Best Available Technology (BAT) standard). But see Masur & 
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upheld the EPA’s discretion to use CBA if it so chooses where the statute was 
ambiguous, suggesting that any apparent anti-CBA presumption arising out of the 
earlier cases is not necessarily strong enough to prevent an agency that wants to from 
pursuing CBA.151  
More importantly for present purposes, in those instances where courts have 
upheld agency use of CBA, they have generally sanctioned an informal type. Thus, 
in Riverkeeper, the Supreme Court endorsed only a fairly informal variety of CBA 
and suggested that more “rigorous form[s]” of CBA might be “preclude[d].”152 This 
approach is consistent with numerous lines of earlier circuit court cases that have 
rejected calls for formal CBA and encouraged agencies to use informal CBA. There 
have been a few isolated exceptions to this trend, but only one case, the Fifth 
Circuit’s famous decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,153 actually invalidated 
an agency rule for its failure to use a more formal CBA.154  
 
1.  Favoring Informality 
 
The issue of CBA in environmental rulemaking came before the Supreme Court 
in 2009, in Riverkeeper. This time, unlike the three prior occasions in which the 
Court had addressed this issue,155 the case involved an agency decision to adopt 
CBA, rather than to reject it. Although the provision at issue—Section 316(b) of the 
Clean Water Act, which regulates the intake of cooling water by power plants and 
other large industrial facilities—appears to set out a standard feasibility criterion, 
the EPA set the standard based on CBA instead. In a six-to-three opinion, the Court 
upheld the Agency’s use of CBA. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, went to 
some pains, however, to make clear that the kind of CBA he was endorsing was far 
toward the informal end of the spectrum:  
 
                                                 
Posner, supra note 71, at 670 (noting that only one court of appeals—the Second Circuit—
has ever rejected an agency decision to employ CBA as exceeding the agency’s authority, 
and that case was Riverkeeper, subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court, Riverkeeper, 
Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 
208, 223 (2009)). 
151 See Masur & Posner, supra note 71, at 669–70. In another recent case, EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1603–04 (2014), the Supreme Court upheld the 
EPA’s decision to read cost considerations into the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision 
in designing the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. But this case—despite Justice Scalia’s 
erroneous suggestion to the contrary, id. at 1610 (Scalia J., dissenting)—did not involve 
actual cost-benefit analysis. It involved something closer to cost-effectiveness or feasibility 
analysis.  
152 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 223. 
153 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
154 See id. at 1222–23. 
155 See cases cited supra note 150. 
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Other arguments may be available to preclude such a rigorous form of 
cost-benefit analysis as that which was prescribed under the statute’s 
former BPT standard, which required weighing “the total cost of 
application of technology” against “the . . . benefits to be achieved.” But 
that question is not before us. 
In the Phase II requirements challenged here the EPA sought only to 
avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits.156 
 
Thus, the majority opinion did not specify exactly what a permissible CBA 
looks like, but it offered enough clues to make clear that the CBA it was endorsing 
fell pretty far toward the informal end of the spectrum along all three axes. First, 
Justice Scalia wrote, “[T]he EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between 
costs and benefits . . . .”157 This indicates informality along both Axis #2 and Axis 
#3. Second, Justice Scalia said that the form of CBA he was endorsing was less 
“rigorous” than that performed under the Best Practicable Control Technology 
(BPT) standard,158 which has typically not monetized benefits.159 This puts Justice 
Scalia’s CBA near the informal end of Axis 1, consistent with Justice Breyer’s view 
that the EPA should describe benefits in “non-monetized terms.”160 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized the distinction between 
formal and informal CBA, clearly endorsing the latter, and highlighted the dangers 
of formal CBA: 
 
The EPA’s reading of the statute would seem to permit it to describe 
environmental benefits in non-monetized terms and to evaluate both costs 
and benefits in accordance with its expert judgment and scientific 
knowledge. The Agency can thereby avoid lengthy formal cost-benefit 
proceedings and futile attempts at comprehensive monetization; take 
account of Congress’ technology-forcing objectives; and still prevent 
results that are absurd or unreasonable in light of extreme disparities 
between costs and benefits.161 
 
Thus, the CBA Justice Breyer envisioned was clearly well toward the informal end 
of the spectrum along Axis 1 (describing benefits in nonmonetized terms) and Axis 
2 (avoiding extreme disparities between costs and benefits).162  
                                                 
156 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 223–24 (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(b)(1)(B)). 
157 Id. at 224. 
158 Id. at 223. 
159 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text. 
160 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 235 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
161 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
162 Justice Breyer’s reading conforms with early agency interpretations of section 
316(b) of the Clean Water Act. See Best Technology Available for the Location, Design, 
Construction, and Capacity of Cooling Water Intake Structures, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387, 17,388 
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The Supreme Court’s expressed preference for informality in the Riverkeeper 
case is consistent with the general trend in the circuits. In multiple lines of cases the 
federal appeals courts have repeatedly and in many contexts endorsed informal over 
formal versions of CBA.  
One example is the line of cases (referenced above) interpreting the interim 
BPT standard that the Clean Water Act required industrial point sources to meet by 
1977. Unlike the other feasibility standards in the Act, this standard directed the EPA 
to consider costs “in relation to” benefits.163 But in interpreting it, the courts have 
emphasized that the agency is to engage in only “a ‘limited’ balancing test,” and that 
“cost need not be balanced against benefits with pinpoint precision.”164 Indeed, the 
circuit courts have routinely upheld CBAs under this provision that simply made an 
apples-to-oranges comparison of costs measured in dollars against benefits 
measured in pounds of pollution removed from a factory’s effluent.165 In so doing, 
they have recognized the Axis 1 limitations inherent in the measurement of water 
pollution—that “many of the benefits resulting from the effluent reduction are 
incapable of precise quantification”166 and “often cannot be reduced to dollars and 
                                                 
(Apr. 26, 1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 402) (“No comparison of monetary costs with the 
social benefits of minimizing adverse environmental impacts, much less a formal, quantified 
‘cost/benefit’ assessment is required by the terms of the Act.”). For a more detailed analysis 
of the Court’s opinion along these lines, see Sinden, supra note 105, at 1189–91. 
163 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring adoption of the “best 
practicable control technology currently available” that is to be determined in part by 
consideration of “the total cost [imposed on industry by the standards] . . . in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved”). 
164 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting 
statement of Senator Muskie in legislative history); see also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone 
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (quoting same language); Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 
615 F.2d 794, 809 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing same language); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 
F.2d 177, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting same language).  
165 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1047 (estimating costs to industry as a whole 
at $1.6 billion and benefits of “5,000 fewer tons per day of BOD discharged into the nation’s 
waters”); Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 808–09 (noting that agency should weigh 
dollar costs against amount of effluent reduction achieved); Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers 
v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 663 (3d Cir. 1983) (approving EPA’s CBA “calculat[ing] that the 
benefits would be an effluent reduction of 140 million pounds of toxic pollutants per year, 
and that the total costs would be $1.34 billion plus $425 million annually.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). 
166 Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 809; see also id. at 805 (“Congress was aware 
that prior enforcement efforts based on water quality standards had not been successful. It 
determined, accordingly, that the Agency should have the authority to require effluent 
reduction benefits as defined by the amount or degree of reduction achieved by a level of 
technology applied to discharge, without the necessity of demonstrating the incremental 
effect of that technology on the quality of the receiving water.”). 
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cents”167—and thus have endorsed a “wholly disproportionate” balancing test, well 
toward the informal end of Axis 2.168  
Several of these courts specifically rejected arguments by various industries 
that the EPA should perform an Economic CBA under this provision.169 In one case, 
members of the American pulp and paper industry pointed to a statement in the 
legislative history from the bill’s sponsor, Senator Muskie, which the EPA had also 
cited in support of its contention that the statute required only a rough, unquantified 
balancing of costs and benefits.170 Senator Muskie had said, “The balancing test 
between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended to limit the application 
of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out 
of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction . . . .”171 The 
EPA emphasized the phrase “wholly out of proportion,” while the industry 
petitioners pointed to the phrases “additional degree” and “marginal level.”172  
The court, however, was unwilling to impose such a formal and precise 
balancing formula on the EPA and rejected the argument that the use of the word 
“marginal” signaled an intent for the agencies to use an Economic CBA.173 The D.C. 
Circuit worried “[a] requirement that EPA perform the elaborate task of calculating 
incremental balances would bog the Agency down in burdensome proceedings on a 
relatively subsidiary task.”174  
                                                 
167 Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Am. 
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 296–97 (3d Cir. 1977) (suggesting Congress did not 
require quantification of benefits); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 809 n.3 
(4th Cir. 1982) (“The power companies simply misread this language when they argue that 
as a matter of statutory interpretation the ‘benefits’ referred to in ‘effluent reduction benefits’ 
necessarily relate to improved receiving water quality.”). 
168 See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 805; Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1045 
n.52. During this time, the EPA applied the same brand of CBA in its guidelines for site-
specific permitting for cooling water intake structures under Section 316(b): directing state 
permit writers to simply ensure that costs were not “wholly disproportionate” to benefits. See 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 225 (2009); Seacoast Anti-Pollution 
League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 311 (1st Cir. 1979). 
169 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1041 n.41 (rejecting argument that BPT 
required a CBA based on economic theory); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 
1037–38 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting industry’s argument that the EPA should have done 
incremental CBA); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656–57 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(same). 
170 See Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1047. 
171 Id. at 1045 n.52 (quoting WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 143, at 170). 
172 Id. at 1045 n.52, 1047. 
173 Id. at 1048. 
174 Id.; see also 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 
432 (1986) (explaining that “cost-sensitive” standards such as BPT or BAT are far different 
than standards justified by formal, monetized cost-benefit analyses, where “every dollar 
spent on technology must return at least a dollar in enhanced water quality”). 
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Indeed, in Weyerhaeuser, the D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the idea that 
regulations should be subject to a formal CBA under the tenets of economic theory: 
 
Apart from this simple “common sense” version of the argument, 
there is a more sophisticated economic version called the “optimal 
pollution” theory. This economic theory contends that there is a level or 
type of pollution that, while technologically capable of being controlled, 
is uneconomic to treat because the benefit from treatment is small and the 
cost of treatment is large. These economic theories are premised on a view 
that we have both adequate information about the effects of pollution to 
set an optimal test, and adequate political and administrative flexibility to 
keep polluters at that level once we allow any pollution to go untreated. 
As discussed in this section, it appears that Congress doubted these 
premises.175 
 
Similarly, a line of cases has upheld the use of CBA by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) in promulgating safety standards under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act for workplace hazards other than toxic 
chemicals. OSHA issues these standards pursuant to the Act’s requirement that they 
be “reasonably necessary.”176 But here, again, the CBA sanctioned by the courts has 
been of a relatively informal variety. The courts have declined to “prescribe any 
rigid formula” for CBA and have repeatedly upheld agency analyses that failed to 
monetize benefits.177  
Another line of cases has interpreted the authority of the Consumer Products 
Safety Commission to regulate hazards that create an “unreasonable risk” of injury 
                                                 
175 Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1041 n.41 (citations omitted). 
176 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2012). 
177 RMI Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Nat’l Grain 
& Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The test under section 3(8) is 
an intermediate one between the feasibility mandate of section 6(b)(5) and a strict cost-
benefit analysis that requires a more formal, specific weighing of quantified benefits against 
costs.”); Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 423 n.18 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e do 
not imply that the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the agency to [conduct a 
formal cost-benefit analysis].”); Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d. 641, 649 (9th 
Cir. 1982); Tex. Indep. Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 411 n.44 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(“A requirement for formal cost-benefit analysis demands that regulatory benefits exceed 
their costs. The reasonably necessary requirement in the Act only demands that the expected 
costs of OSHA regulations be reasonably related to the expected benefits, leaving 
considerable discretion for the agency as long as it is exercised on substantial evidence and 
with an adequate statement of reasons.”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982, 989–
90 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding agency’s analysis that described benefits to employees of 
reduced noise exposure in completely non-monetized terms and costs in partially non-
monetized terms); Turner Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (describing 
benefits in non-monetized terms). 
2015] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 141 
 
to authorize the use of CBA.178 Here also the courts have eschewed formal CBA, 
observing that the CBA conducted by the commission need not be “elaborate,”179 
and comparing it to the kind of balancing “familiar in tort law.”180 And yet another 
line of cases under the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Management Act 
have similarly rejected formal CBA, holding that it is “not realistic to expect 
[Fisheries Management Councils] to quantify” economic impacts of fisheries 
regulation on fishing communities or to “undertake a rigorous exercise in 
microeconomic analysis.”181 Again, the analyses upheld by the courts in these cases 
have involved no more than an apples-to-oranges balancing of primarily qualitative 
costs and benefits.182  
Thus, while the courts have interpreted some statutes as forbidding agency use 
of CBA altogether, in those cases in which the courts have authorized agency use of 
CBA, they have generally called for a CBA that falls on the informal end of the 
spectrum. There have been a few exceptions to this general trend, however.  
 
2.  Exceptions 
 
The most prominent exception is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA, in which the court considered an industry challenge to the EPA’s 
ban on asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).183 As noted above, 
there was considerable reason to conclude based on the statutory language and 
                                                 
178 15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (2012); see also id. § 2058(f)(2) (2012) (barring the 
Commission from issuing a new rule “unless it has prepared . . . a final regulatory analysis 
of the rule containing . . . [a] description of the potential benefits and potential costs of the 
rule”). 
179 Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831, 840 
(5th Cir. 1978). 
180 Forester v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 559 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
181 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Sec’y of Commerce, 494 F. Supp. 626, 
631 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“It is simply not realistic to expect the Council to quantify 
foreclosures, bankruptcies, fishing accidents, and unemployment rates[, or to] . . . foresee[] 
the wild gyrations in interest rates that have recently occurred. . . . [This is] an agency whose 
job is to weigh broad environmental and economic elements.”); see also Alaska Factory 
Trawler Ass’n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in reviewing a 
fisheries management plan for conformance with the national standards set forth in the Act, 
“[t]he Secretary [of Commerce] does not have to conduct a formal cost/benefit analysis” of 
the measure). 
182 At least one similar decision rejecting formal CBA has come down in the context of 
a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) dam relicensing decision. See 
Conservation Law Found. v. FERC, 216 F.3d 41, 46–47 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding FERC’s 
decision to reject a proposal to restore in-stream flows to a dammed channel based in part on 
an assessment of the costs of the proposal in monetized terms juxtaposed against a 
nonquantified assessment of the benefits: “Certainly, nothing in the [Federal Power Act] 
requires the Commission to place a dollar value on nonpower benefits”). 
183 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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legislative history that Congress intended the EPA to undertake only a very informal 
version of CBA in setting standards under the Act.184 Nonetheless, in a long and 
detailed opinion, the Fifth Circuit struck down the EPA’s rule on the ground that its 
CBA was inadequate.185 And the opinion made clear that the CBA was inadequate 
precisely because it fell too far toward the informality end of each of the three axes 
identified in Part II.  
The court’s first set of criticisms related to Axis 1. It faulted the Agency for 
failing to more fully quantify and monetize the benefits of the regulation and for 
failing to apply a discount rate to benefits, which, of course, would have required 
full monetization.186 Next, the court criticized the Agency on Axis 2 grounds for 
using insufficient precision in its balancing of costs against benefits, criticizing the 
Agency for essentially using a break-even analysis to conclude that unquantified 
benefits were large enough to justify a finding that benefits outweighed costs, even 
though monetized benefits fell significantly short of monetized costs.187 The court 
found this approach unacceptable, saying, “Unquantified benefits can, at times, 
permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They cannot, however, be used to effect 
a wholesale shift on the balance beam.” 188 Finally, the court specifically demanded 
a move toward formality on Axis 3 as well, faulting the Agency for evaluating only 
a single regulatory alternative rather than estimating costs and benefits for a whole 
range of alternatives in order to maximize net benefits.189  
Consistent with the tendency in the academic debate for CBA proponents to 
disavow any insistence on formality, the court stressed that the EPA need not 
“engage in an exhaustive, full-scale cost-benefit analysis”190 and asserted that “[a]n 
agency may exercise its judgment without strictly relying upon quantifiable risks, 
costs, and benefits . . . .”191 But these protestations had little impact in the face of the 
court’s substantive analysis. After the court remanded the case, the EPA, which had 
already spent ten years preparing the first CBA, gave up entirely. The Agency never 
tried to promulgate the ban on asbestos again, nor, indeed, to take any significant 
regulatory action under TSCA.192 
Another U.S. Court of Appeals decision permits but does not require agency 
reliance on a formal version of CBA. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National 
                                                 
184 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
185 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30. 
186 Id. at 1218. 
187 Id. at 1218–19. 
188 Id. at 1219. Even though, for the rule as a whole, benefits outweighed costs, certain 
aspects of the rule, when viewed in isolation, appeared to have large costs in relation to 
benefits. The EPA’s calculations showed, for example, that the ban on asbestos pipe would 
cost well over a hundred million dollars but save only three lives. Id. 
189 Id. at 1217. 
190 Id. at 1222. 
191 Id. at 1214. 
192 See McGarity, supra note 128, at 2343. 
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Highway Traffic Safety Administration,193 environmentalists challenged the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rule setting Corporate 
Average Fuel Efficiency Standards (CAFE) for light trucks in model years 2008–
2011.194 In arriving at the fuel efficiency standard, the Agency had performed a 
highly formal CBA. Indeed, it had actually conducted an Economic CBA, measuring 
costs and benefits for a whole range of efficiency levels and setting the standard “at 
the point where marginal costs equaled marginal benefits.”195 The environmentalists 
argued that in conducting the CBA, the Agency had erred in failing to account for 
the climate change benefits of increased fuel efficiency.196 The Ninth Circuit agreed, 
faulting the Agency for its failure to include a monetized value for the benefit of 
reducing carbon emissions, especially given that the Agency had “monetized other 
uncertain benefits.”197  
This case then is very different from Corrosion Proof Fittings, where the court 
faulted the Agency for not using formal CBA.198 Center for Biological Diversity, in 
contrast, simply stands for the proposition that where an agency elects on its own to 
employ a highly formal variety of CBA it must be consistent by quantifying and 
monetizing all relevant benefits.199 Thus, while permitting agency use of formal 
CBA, this case certainly does not require it. Rather, it seems aimed at avoiding the 
kind of false formality that I discuss in more detail in Part V—where an agency 
inappropriately combines formal and informal elements of CBA in a single 
analysis.200 
                                                 
193 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
194 Id. at 1180.  
195 Id. at 1191. The statute itself did not explicitly call for formal CBA, or necessarily 
for CBA at all. It simply directed NHTSA to set fuel economy standards at “the maximum 
feasible . . . level,” and to take into account in that determination “technological feasibility, 
economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards . . . on fuel economy, and 
the need of the United States to conserve energy.” Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), (f) (2012). 
196 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1187–89. 
197 Id. at 1202. 
198 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991). 
199 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1187–89. A recent district court case 
involving a challenge to an environmental impact statement issued in connection with coal 
leasing on federal lands reached a similar conclusion. High Country Conservation Advocates 
v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 13-CV-01723-RBJ, 2014 WL 2922751 at *10 (D. Colo. July 27, 
2014) (“Even though NEPA does not require a cost-benefit analysis, it was nonetheless 
arbitrary and capricious to quantify the benefits of the lease modifications and then explain 
that a similar analysis of the costs was impossible when such an analysis was in fact possible 
[by use of the social cost of carbon].”). For more on NEPA (the National Environmental 
Policy Act), see supra note 148. 
200 Professor Revesz cites Center for Biological Diversity, along with another case, 
Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), as examples of courts pushing agencies to quantify benefits in their CBAs. Revesz, 
supra note 63. Public Citizen involved a rule issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
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A third case that is often cited as an example of a federal court endorsing CBA 
is a D.C. Circuit opinion on OSHA’s “lock out/tag out rule” in which prominent 
CBA proponent Judge Stephen Williams urged OSHA to adopt formal CBA.201 The 
views on CBA expressed by Judge Williams in that case, however, ultimately had 
little effect since on remand OSHA pointedly declined his invitation to use formal 
CBA.  
As noted above, in the case law interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had already endorsed a relatively 
informal version of CBA for workplace safety standards outside the context of toxic 
chemicals. But in the lock out/tag out case, Judge Williams parted company with 
those courts, specifically urging OSHA to instead adopt a highly formal type of 
CBA. He explicitly linked the CBA he was envisioning to economic theory: 
“[P]roperly conducted cost-benefit analysis should yield a solution approximating 
that of a market undistorted by market failures.”202 He also indicated that OSHA 
should monetize the benefits of human lives and human health.203 On remand, 
                                                 
Administration to limit the hours of truck drivers and other commercial vehicle drivers. Pub. 
Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1216. The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule but not on the basis of the 
Agency’s CBA. Id. In dicta, however, the court did criticize the Agency for its failure to 
require electric onboard recorders (EOBRs) that would monitor compliance with the rules, 
expressing skepticism, in particular, at the Agency’s proffered justification—“that the costs 
and benefits of EOBRs are unknown.” Id. at 1221. This apparently prompted the Agency to 
look more carefully at the CBA, and, on remand, it actually quantified both the costs and 
benefits of requiring EOBRs, finding annual net benefits in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually. Electronic On-Board Recorders and Hours of Service Supporting 
Documents, 76 Fed. Reg. 5,537, 5,547–48 (Feb. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 
385, 390, 395). 
Though aptly cited by Professor Revesz in the context of his argument, whether this is 
an example of a court actually requiring formal CBA is less clear. Even putting aside the fact 
that the CBA discussion was dicta, it is not entirely clear that the court necessarily had in 
mind full quantification and/or monetization in suggesting that the Agency should 
“estimat[e] the costs,” and “at least . . . attempt to analyze [the] benefits” of the rule. Pub. 
Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221–22. The court did say that the statute (which contained a directive 
to “consider” costs and benefits) required the Agency “to collect and analyze data on the 
costs and benefits,” and “to estimate [the] benefits on imperfect empirical assumptions.” Id. 
The court also acknowledged, however, that the Agency’s estimates might be “imprecise,” 
and suggested that at least one factor to be weighed in the balance was the (presumably 
unquantifiable) possibility that the devices “might be unduly intrusive.” Id.  
201 Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
202 Id. at 1319.  
203 See id. at 1320–21. Judge Williams also authored another opinion in 1991 
interpreting an open-ended provision of the Clean Air Act to give the EPA discretion to use 
CBA in deciding whether to exclude surface coal mines’ fugitive emissions from the 
threshold for PSD permitting. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). In that opinion, however, Judge Williams did not make any specific 
comment as to the level of formality the EPA should employ in such CBAs. See id. 
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however, in a rebuke to Judge Williams, the Agency explicitly rejected what it called 
the “formal cost-benefit analysis” that his opinion had urged on it.204 OSHA argued  
 
that problems associated with formal cost-benefit analysis militate against 
its use in safety rulemaking. The formal cost-benefit analysis discussed by 
the court is generally understood to require that all the costs and benefits 
of a particular action be identified, monetized and compared. Each stage 
of this analysis—selection of relevant costs and benefits, assignment of 
monetary values, and judgment of relative worth—presents complex 
policy and factual issues, the resolution of which is not necessarily more 
precise or rational than resolution of the issues OSHA currently addresses 
and which could result in significantly protracted agency rulemaking.205 
 
The ultimate legal question for the court was whether the Agency was 
interpreting the statute in a way that provided sufficient guidance to withstand a 
constitutional challenge under the nondelegation doctrine.206 Thus, Judge 
Williams’s opinion had not required the Agency to use formal CBA; it had merely 
suggested it as “at least one interpretation” of the statute that would survive 
constitutional attack.207 When the case subsequently went back to the D.C. Circuit, 
Judge Williams and the rest of the panel deferred (though somewhat grudgingly) to 
the Agency, holding that its alternative interpretation did “guide[] its choice of safety 
standards enough to satisfy the demands of the nondelegation doctrine.”208 
In sum, while these three cases appear to superficially endorse a more formal 
version of CBA, only one actually invalidated a rule for an agency’s decision to use 
informal CBA. And in the face of these few exceptions stand the numerous federal 
court decisions discussed above that have eschewed formal CBA and encouraged 
agencies to instead use a highly informal style of CBA much closer to the Ben 
Franklin end of the spectrum.209 
                                                 
204 Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612, 
16,622 (Mar. 30, 1993) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).  
205 Id. 
206 Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1321. 
207 Id. at 1313. 
208 Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also id. at 670 
(“In any event, the current case does not require us to decide whether the statute requires a 
reasonable relationship between a rule’s costs and its benefits.”). 
209 Professor Sunstein’s theory that the federal courts have adopted a set of “cost-benefit 
default rules”—explicated in his 2002 book, The Cost-Benefit State, supra note 2—is largely 
consistent with this view. In making this argument, he did not distinguish between formal 
and informal CBA, but a careful look at the cases behind his “default rules” shows that, in 
fact, the vast majority of them endorse informal rather than formal varieties of CBA. Indeed, 
many of the “cost-benefit default rules” that Professor Sunstein found in various court 
opinions, in his words, “fall far short of calling for full-fledged cost-benefit analysis.” 
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 33. Instead, they involve principles that 
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While the weight of the case law certainly favors informality, some might still 
argue that the trend is in the opposite direction. It is true that many of the cases 
endorsing informal CBA were issued in the 1970s and 1980s, while those cases that 
arguably endorse a more formal brand of CBA have occurred in the 1990s and 
onward. It is possible then—though certainly far from clear—that we are seeing an 
incipient trend in the federal courts toward formality in CBA. A recent D.C. Circuit 
case outside the environmental arena, Business Roundtable v. SEC,210 which has 
received a lot of attention for requiring CBA of securities regulations and faulting 
the Agency for not quantifying certain costs and benefits, could also be read to augur 
such a trend.211 But that opinion is not a model of clarity, and it is not at all clear 
whether the court was actually demanding the kind of comprehensive monetization 
that would put a CBA on the formal end of the spectrum.212 Moreover, since 
                                                 
Professor Sunstein viewed as related to CBA or evidencing a CBA sensibility. Thus, he 
pointed to cases authorizing agencies to make “de minimis” exceptions to regulatory 
requirements, id. at 33–37, to cases requiring agencies to also consider potential 
countervailing adverse health impacts when considering the health benefits of a rule, id. at 
37–40, and to cases allowing agencies to consider costs without actually balancing them 
against benefits, see, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
Only five of the cases Professor Sunstein cited could be said to involve actual CBA. Of 
these, two involved an informal Ben Franklin balancing of qualitative pros and cons. See 
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); George E. Warren 
Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998). One approved a CBA prepared by the EPA 
that contained some indicia of formality (some monetization of costs and benefits for four 
different regulatory alternatives), but left significant benefits unquantified. See Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 646–47 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Requirements for 
Implementation Plans, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,870, 48,873 (Nov. 28, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52). The other two cases were Judge Williams’s decision on OSHA’s lockout/tagout 
rule and the Fifth Circuit’s Corrosion Proof Fittings decision, both discussed above. For an 
argument that Professor Sunstein’s “cost-benefit default rules” are largely imaginary, see 
Sinden, supra note 149.  
210 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
211 See id. at 1150.  
212 The case involved an SEC rule requiring corporate boards to include in their proxy 
voting materials candidates to board vacancies nominated by shareholders. Id. at 1147. The 
rule was aimed at improving shareholder democracy—a social value that, like environmental 
quality and public health, is in some sense intangible. See id. at 1149. But while the court 
faulted the Agency for failing to consider certain particular costs and benefits, it was not 
clear that in every instance the court expected quantification. For example, one aspect of the 
benefits analysis that the court found wanting was the Agency’s conclusion that the rule 
would “improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the 
election of dissident shareholder nominees.” Id. at 1150. This was a benefit that the Agency 
had described in purely qualitative terms, but the court did not suggest that the Agency 
should try to quantify it. See id. Rather, the court objected to the fact that the SEC had “relied 
exclusively and heavily” on two particular studies that the court found “unpersuasive.” Id. at 
1151. See Coates IV, supra note 9, at 29 (criticizing the D.C. Circuit for “characteriz[ing] 
(without explanation) a peer-reviewed article published in the Journal of Financial 
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Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit has handed down two cases about financial 
regulation that have been quite explicit in their rejection of formal CBA.213 In the 
words of the court, “An agency is not required ‘to measure the immeasurable,’ and 
need not conduct a ‘rigorous, quantitative economic analysis’ unless the statute 
explicitly directs it to do so.”214 Finally, back in the environmental arena, any notion 
that the handful of cases from the last two decades endorsing more formality in CBA 
constitute an incipient trend is far harder to defend in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Riverkeeper, which cuts pretty clearly in the opposite direction. 
In sum, courts have in a number of instances rejected agency use of CBA 
altogether in setting environmental health and safety standards. And in those 
instances in which courts have endorsed agency use of CBA, they have typically 
sanctioned only an informal version of CBA that does not require full quantification 
or monetization of costs and benefits (Axis 1), requires only a rough balancing (Axis 
2), and requires analysis of only a single option in relation to the status quo (Axis 
3).  
 
V.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: BUCKING THE TREND 
 
The law, then, does not generally push agencies in the direction of formality 
and, indeed, often seems to push in the opposite direction. In light of this tendency 
toward informality in Congress and the courts, along with the observations above 
                                                 
Economics as ‘relatively unpersuasive’”). Thus, it is not at all clear that the court was 
demanding anything more than a partial quantification of costs and benefits.  
The two earlier cases relied on by the court in Business Roundtable similarly did not 
require full quantification of costs and benefits. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 
613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (striking down an SEC rule that narrowed a pre-existing 
exception so as to subject certain annuity contracts to the securities laws for an agency’s 
failure to correctly define the baseline status quo against which the “efficiency” of the new 
rule would be assessed); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(striking down SEC rule requiring certain mutual funds to have boards made up of 75% 
independent directors and an independent chair for agency’s failure to adequately quantify 
costs of the rule, but rejecting industry’s claim that its assessment of the benefits was 
inadequate: “[W]e are acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every 
action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be 
‘entitled to conduct . . . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’” (quoting Melcher 
v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
213 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting 
industry claim that SEC performed an inadequate CBA in connection with its rule imposing 
disclosure requirements on companies using minerals obtained in and around the Democratic 
Republic of Congo where trade in such minerals helps to fuel armed conflict); Inv. Co. Inst. 
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 370, 370–78 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding 
against a CBA challenge a rule issued by the CFTC narrowing an exception that had 
previously allowed certain kinds of derivatives to escape regulation under the Commodity 
Exchange Act). 
214 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 369 (quoting Inv. Co. Inst., 720 F.3d at 379). 
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about the academic debate, we might expect to see the agencies and the White House 
moving toward informality as well. That does, after all, appear to be the path of least 
resistance. Surprisingly, a close look at the executive orders and guidance 
documents that govern agency use of CBA, as well as anecdotal evidence of agency 
practice, suggests a marked pull in the opposite direction. The executive branch, 
particularly the White House, appears to push toward more formality in CBA. 
 
A.  Executive Orders and Guidance 
 
There is a strange disconnect in environmental law between what statutes tell 
the agencies to do and what executive orders tell them to do.215 As detailed above, 
the vast majority of this country’s environmental statutes direct the agencies to set 
regulatory standards using some criterion other than CBA, and some even outright 
prohibit the use of CBA.216 Yet, at the same time, in a kind of parallel universe, a 
series of executive orders, dating back to President Reagan, direct executive branch 
agencies to perform CBA on all “major” regulations—that is, those costing $100 
million or more per year. Since an executive order obviously cannot trump a 
statutory command, this can put the agencies in the anomalous position of having to 
prepare a CBA that they cannot actually use in making their decision.217 A similar 
disconnect exists with respect to the formality of CBA, with statutes and court 
decisions endorsing primarily informal CBA while the executive orders and 
guidance documents prescribe a form of CBA that falls well toward the formal end 
of the spectrum.218 
The CBA executive order that President Bill Clinton issued in 1993 is still in 
effect and requires agencies to propose or adopt regulations “only upon a reasoned 
                                                 
215 See Masur & Posner, supra note 71, at 667 (noting that as a result of this disconnect 
“[a]gencies thus find themselves whipsawed”). 
216 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (determining that 
EPA may not use CBA in setting Clean Air Act’s air quality standards); Am. Textile Mfrs. 
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512–13 (1981) (holding that Occupational Safety and 
Health Act directs OSHA to set workplace health standards for toxics on the basis of a 
feasibility test, which the Court viewed as inconsistent with CBA); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (holding that Endangered Species Act imposes absolute duties 
on federal agencies “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the 
cost” that preclude CBA). 
217 The requirement that agencies conduct CBAs of major rules also appears in the 
UMRA. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–71 (2012). See supra note 148. The UMRA requires 
agencies to prepare a CBA of major rules, id. § 1532(a), and to use the CBA to choose the 
“least burdensome” alternative, id. § 1535(a), but provides an exception to that requirement 
where it is “inconsistent with law,” id. § 1535(b)(2). Accordingly, like the executive orders, 
the UMRA does not trump other statutes. 
218 See Cannon, supra note 9, at 455 (“[A]rguably the strong form of CBA is codified 
for significant rulemakings in federal administrative practice . . . .”). 
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determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”219 While 
it is not entirely clear where along Axis 2 this “justify” formulation falls, most 
observers assume that it represents a slight shift toward informality in comparison 
to President Reagan’s Executive Order, which required benefits to “outweigh” 
costs.220 President Clinton’s Order also makes a few nods toward informality along 
Axis 1, making several references to the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
quantify certain values and directing that costs and benefits “be understood to 
include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully 
estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify 
but nevertheless essential to consider.”221 On the other hand, President Clinton’s 
Order also contains language very similar to President Reagan’s Order that seems to 
tilt decidedly toward formality, requiring agencies to choose “among alternative 
regulatory approaches” so as to “select those approaches that maximize net 
                                                 
219 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted as amended 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012). In 2007, President George W. Bush supplemented 
Executive Order 12,866 with Executive Order 13,422, which, in addition to CBA of major 
rules, required a finding that the rule aimed at curing some “specific market failure.” Exec. 
Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008). It also expanded the power of OIRA over rulemaking 
by applying the CBA mandate to guidance documents as well as rules and by requiring a 
presidential appointee to serve as Regulatory Policy Officer within each agency. Id. President 
Obama revoked this executive order, however, soon after taking office. Exec. Order No. 
13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102. 
220 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982) (“Regulatory action shall 
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the 
potential costs to society.”). See, e.g., Graham, supra note 2, at 433 (describing the “justify” 
formulation as the “‘soft’ benefit-cost test”). This view is strengthened by the fact that the 
“justify” language in the Clinton Executive Order is preceded by another reference to the 
difficulty of quantifying benefits: “Each agency shall . . .[,] recognizing that some costs and 
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits . . . justify its costs.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(6), 3 
C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994) (emphasis added).  
The antiregulatory mission of the Reagan Executive Order was made clear in its 
preamble, which stated that the purpose of the executive order was, inter alia, “to reduce the 
burdens of existing and future regulations.” Id. pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 127. (That language was 
omitted from the subsequent Clinton Order, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 
(1994).) For an historical account of how CBA has been pushed by political conservatives 
and industry over the years, see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 21–30. 
221 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39. President Reagan’s Order 
contained similar language about nonquantifiable costs and benefits, but stopped short of 
calling them “essential to consider.” See Exec. Order No. 12,291 §3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 129 
(requiring the description of benefits, costs, and net benefits to each include “any . . . effects 
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms”). 
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benefits.”222 This directive for net benefits maximization requires a CBA near the 
formal end of the spectrum along all three axes.223  
Soon after President Obama came into office in 2009, he considered revoking 
Executive Order 12,866, and, in fact, solicited public comment on that idea.224 
Ultimately, however, he left the prior order in place and instead simply issued 
Executive Order 13,563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” which 
“supplement[s] . . . and reaffirms” the Clinton Order.225 This new order reiterates 
some of the key language of Executive Order 12,866, including the requirement that 
agencies show that a regulation’s “benefits justify its costs”; the requirement that 
they “select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches 
that maximize net benefits”; and the recognition “that some benefits and costs are 
difficult to quantify.”226 In language that arguably shifts even further toward 
formality and has no analogue in the Clinton Order, however, it also unambiguously 
sets out full quantification as the goal, stating that “each agency is directed to use 
the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and 
costs as accurately as possible.”227 It follows this statement with an acknowledgment 
of the difficulties that arise in attempting to quantify some values, but makes the 
directive that agencies discuss unquantifiable values permissive rather than 
mandatory: “Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider 
(and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, 
including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.”228  
The executive orders’ CBA directive was further refined and clarified in OMB 
Circular A-4, which was issued by OIRA in 2003.229 This document is also clear in 
setting up Economic CBA as the goal, stating that CBA “provide[s] a systematic 
framework for identifying and evaluating the likely outcomes of alternative 
                                                 
222 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39. A subsequent section of the 
executive order also requires the agency to submit to OIRA “[a]n assessment, including the 
underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible 
alternatives to the planned regulation.” Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646. President 
Reagan’s Order similarly stated, “Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net 
benefits to society” and “[a]mong alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, 
the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.” Exec. Order No. 12,291 
§2(c)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 128. 
223 See supra Part II.C.3. 
224 See Memorandum: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009) (directing 
OMB to produce recommendations for a new executive order on regulatory review); Federal 
Regulatory Review, Request for Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009) (OMB 
requesting public comment on those recommendations). 
225 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 app. at 102–03 (2012). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 216. 
228 Id. (emphasis added). 
229 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 1 (2003). 
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regulatory choices,”230 and that “[w]here all benefits and costs can be quantified and 
expressed in monetary units, benefit-cost analysis [BCA] provides decision makers 
with a clear indication of the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative that 
generates the largest net benefits to society (ignoring distributional effects).”231 
Later it reiterates the same point, saying, “By measuring incremental benefits and 
costs of successively more stringent regulatory alternatives, you can identify the 
alternative that maximizes net benefits.”232 The Circular is clearly grounded in 
economic theory and uses the language of that discipline, directing agencies to 
measure costs and benefits in terms of “opportunity costs” and “willingness-to-
pay.”233 
While acknowledging that “[i]t will not always be possible to express in 
monetary units all of the important benefits and costs,”234 the OMB Circular clearly 
contemplates complete monetization as the goal and the norm: “A distinctive feature 
of BCA is that both benefits and costs are expressed in monetary units, which allows 
you to evaluate different regulatory options with a variety of attributes using a 
common measure.”235  
The EPA’s Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses are similarly geared 
toward a highly formal CBA.236 The introduction frames the CBA endeavor from 
the outset in the language of economic theory: “[The Potential Pareto] criterion is 
the foundation of BCA, requiring that a policy’s net benefits to society be positive. 
. . . The policy that maximizes net benefits is considered the most efficient.”237 And 
the guidelines contain a detailed appendix that provides a textbook introduction to 
                                                 
230 Id. at 9. 
231 Id. at 2. 
232 Id. at 10. Later, the Circular reiterates the importance of measuring the costs and 
benefits of a whole range of incrementally varying alternatives (formality on Axis 3), 
directing agencies to “present both total and incremental benefits and costs” of successive 
alternatives. Id. at 16. 
233 Id. at 18. The Circular also makes repeated reference to the importance of ensuring 
that the methods used by agencies in preparing CBAs are “consistent with economic theory.” 
Id. at 21, 23.  
234 Id. at 2. 
235 Id. at 10. (“BCA” or “benefit-cost analysis” is a synonym for CBA. See supra note 
3.) Similarly, by requiring all costs and benefits to be discounted at both 3 and 7 percent, the 
OMB Circular clearly assumes full monetization, or at least quantification. See id. at 31–37; 
see also id. at 36 (assuming that non-monetized benefits are at least quantified: “[E]ven for 
benefits and costs that are not expressed in monetary units . . . [t]he timing differences can 
be handled through discounting.”).  
236 GUIDELINES, supra note 12. 
237 Id. at 1-4. Starting in 1983, the EPA issued a series of guidelines for preparing CBAs. 
The Agency released its most recent version in December 2010 (with some discrete updates 
relating to environmental justice added in May 2014). See id. at 1-1. This document was 
prepared by economists at the EPA and subsequently peer reviewed by the EPA’s Science 
Advisory Board.  
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the fundamentals of economic theory.238 Thus, like the OMB Circular, the EPA’s 
guidelines require that “[b]enefits and costs should be reported in monetary terms 
whenever possible” and that “[b]enefits and costs that cannot be monetized should, 
if possible, be quantified,” while also acknowledging that “[i]n reality . . . there are 
often effects that cannot be monetized, and the analysis needs to communicate the 
full richness of benefit and cost information beyond what can be put in dollar 
terms.” 239 Nonetheless, despite these caveats, the guidelines require a strict 
numerical comparison of costs against benefits in order “to determine a regulation’s 
net benefits, even if important benefits or costs cannot be monetized.”240 This 
language pulls strongly in the direction of formality, and arguably encourages false 
formality, by directing the Agency to combine inconsistent positions on Axes 1 and 
2.241 
Thus, the language in the executive orders providing that benefits need only 
“justify” costs and acknowledging that some costs and benefits will be 
unquantifiable gives a nod to informality on Axes 2 and 1 (respectively) and suggests 
that informality may, at times, be tolerated. But, at the same time, the repeated 
references in the executive orders and the guidance documents to maximizing net 
benefits and quantifying costs and benefits “as accurately as possible” clearly set up 
Economic CBA as the goal.242  
 
B.  Agency Practice 
 
Anecdotal evidence also indicates a tilt toward formality in agency practice, at 
least at the EPA.243 Two examples can be found in the EPA rulemakings on cooling 
water intake structures—first, in the rulemaking the Court ultimately reviewed in 
Riverkeeper, and, second, in the rulemaking that followed the Supreme Court’s 
remand in that case. The basic outlines of these two examples are described below. 
More detail can be found in my article, Cost Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin, and the 
Supreme Court.244  
                                                 
238 Id. app. A. 
239 Id. at 11-2. 
240 Id. at 11-3 (emphasis added). 
241 See supra Figure 7. 
242 See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 (2012). 
243 Christopher Carrigan & Stuart Shapiro, What’s Wrong with the Back of the 
Envelope? A Call for Simple (and Timely) Benefit-Cost Analysis 5 (Geo. Wash. U. Reg. 
Studies Ctr., Working Paper Oct. 2014), available at http://regulatorystudies.columbian. 
gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Carrigan_Shapiro-
Back-of-the-Envelope.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XNM5-9R2Z (arguing that 
“[Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)] appear to be becoming more complex” based on an 
analysis of data showing that RIAs prepared between 2009 and 2012 were over four times 
longer on average than RIAs prepared in 2000). 
244 See generally Sinden, supra note 105. 
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1.  EPA’s CBA on Cooling Water Intakes: Round I 
 
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the EPA to regulate cooling water 
intake structures at power plants and other large industrial facilities.245 These 
structures withdraw billions of gallons of water a day from rivers, lakes, and 
estuaries, and, in so doing, kill billions of fish and aquatic organisms, squashing 
them against intake screens and sucking them up into the internal workings of the 
plant. The EPA issued Phase I of these regulations, governing new facilities, in 2001. 
In so doing, the EPA interpreted the statutory language requiring “the best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” as a 
straightforward feasibility standard,246 comparing facilities’ projected compliance 
costs for various technologies to their projected revenues.247 On this basis, the EPA 
concluded that closed cycle cooling—a method that minimizes the amount of water 
used by recirculating it—was the “best technology available” (BTA) with costs of 
less than 1% of revenues for all but nine of the affected facilities.248 When it came 
time to submit a CBA to OIRA under Executive Order 12,866,249 the EPA left it 
informal, making no effort to quantify or monetize the environmental benefits of the 
rule, or to compare them to costs.250  
Phase II governed existing plants. Because retrofitting an existing plant to 
incorporate closed cycle cooling costs more than incorporating it into a new plant’s 
design, in the draft proposed rule it sent to OIRA, the EPA proposed to only require 
closed cycle cooling for the fifty-nine largest and most damaging plants.251 The 
others would be allowed to use the older “once-through” technology and make 
                                                 
245 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012). 
246 Id.; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations Addressing 
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,060, 49,065 (proposed 
Aug. 10, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–25) [hereinafter Proposed Phase I New 
Facilities Rule]. 
247 Proposed Phase I New Facilities Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 49,095. 
248 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations Addressing 
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256, 65,324 (Dec. 18, 
2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–25) [hereinafter Final Phase I New Facilities Rule].  
249 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 app. at 88–92 (2012).  
250 Final Phase I New Facilities Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,312 (“[I]t is neither required 
nor prudent for EPA to develop empirical estimates of benefits where data limitations or 
other critical constraints preclude doing so in a credible and reliable manner.”). OIRA 
sometimes pushes back in such situations, sending rules back to the EPA with demands for 
more quantification. But this time it accepted the CBA as is. See id. at 65,327 (stating that 
the final rule was reviewed by OIRA); id. at 65,312 (stating that the CBA associated with 
the final rule did not quantify the rule’s benefits). 
251 EPA, OMB Review Draft for the Proposed Section 316(b) Rule for Large Cooling 
Water Intake Structures at Existing Power Generating Facilities, Docket W-00-32, DCN # 
4-4005, at 72 (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter OMB Review Draft—Proposed Phase II Rule]. 
154 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
 
relatively modest changes to their intake structures—new types of screens and filters 
that are less effective at saving fish, but also less expensive.252 As it had done for the 
new plants, the EPA assessed the “economic practicability” of this proposal by 
comparing compliance costs to annual revenues.253 Its conclusion was that 
compliance costs would be “low.” Indeed, 82% of firms would incur compliance 
costs of less than 0.5% of revenues, and 91% would incur costs of less than 1%.254  
This time, however, the EPA took a very different approach to the CBA. Rather 
than declining to attempt any quantification of benefits, as it had done with the Phase 
I rule, the Agency spent enormous amounts of time and resources attempting to 
devise a fully quantified and monetized CBA.255 The problem was that the data 
available on the ecological and other benefits of reducing harms to fish and other 
aquatic organisms were vastly incomplete, and the methods for converting such data 
into monetary equivalents were highly controversial.  
Accordingly, the EPA left out whole categories of aquatic organisms for which 
it simply had no data.256 And of those it did include, the Agency counted less than 
2% of the individuals in each species.257 This represented the fraction of the total 
population that could actually be expected to be caught by commercial or 
recreational fisherman once they escaped the cooling water intake structures.258 The 
                                                 
252 Id. at 75. 
253 Compare National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations 
To Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing 
Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,158 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Phase 
II Existing Facilities Rule], with supra notes 246–248 and accompanying text. 
254 Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158 ex.5. 
255 The EPA recognized that the task would be “challenging,” National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling 
Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,613 (July 9, 
2004) [hereinafter Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule], and expressed concern from the 
outset that formal CBAs under the CWA have generally “been limited in the range of benefits 
addressed,” thus “hinder[ing] EPA’s ability to compare . . . benefits and costs . . . 
comprehensively,” Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,191. 
256 These included phytoplankton, zooplankton, endangered sea turtles, shrimp, crabs, 
and lobsters, among others. See Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
41,586; OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT FOR THE FINAL SECTION 
316(B) PHASE II EXISTING FACILITIES RULE, EPA-821-R-02-003, at A9-1 (2004) [hereinafter 
REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT—FINAL PHASE II RULE], available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/Cooling-Water_Phase-2_ 
Regional-benefits_2004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZYS-RHH8; OFFICE OF WATER, 
EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) PHASE II 
EXISTING FACILITIES RULE, EPA-821-R-02-001, at C1-7 (2002) [hereinafter ECONOMIC AND 
BENEFITS ANALYSIS—FINAL PHASE II RULE], available at http://water.epa.gov/laws 
regs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/Cooling-Water_Phase-2_Economics_2004.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XYL5-9WKJ. 
257 Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,660–61.  
258 Id. 
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EPA candidly admitted that it had vastly undercounted the fish that would be 
protected by the rule, stating that its estimate “does not account for the benefits from 
the remaining 98.2% of the . . . aquatic organisms estimated to be protected 
nationally under today’s rule.”259 Nonetheless, the Agency continued to doggedly 
pursue a formal CBA. 
Next, the Agency had to tackle the difficult task of assigning monetary values 
to the fish. With respect to the fish that would be commercially caught, the EPA 
simply used the market price.260 But assigning a monetary value to recreational 
fishing and ecological benefits posed more of a challenge.261 Several monetization 
methods the EPA used initially proved controversial.262 Ultimately, after receiving 
considerable criticism in the comments to the proposed rule, the EPA threw up its 
hands and attached no dollar value at all to the vast majority of the ecological values, 
effectively zeroing them out.263  
In the end, the EPA flatly acknowledged that the exercise had been a failure. 
Its benefits estimate was grossly incomplete, making a meaningful comparison with 
costs impossible: “EPA notes that these analyses are based on a comparison of a 
partial measure of benefits with a complete measure of costs; therefore, the results 
must be interpreted with caution.”264  
Nonetheless, it appears that the EPA (presumably under pressure from OIRA) 
used this flawed CBA as the basis for significantly weakening the rule. When the 
rule emerged from OIRA review, the closed cycle cooling requirement for the fifty-
nine most damaging plants had been removed, making those plants subject to the 
                                                 
259 Id. at 41,661.  
260 Id. at 41,659–60.  
261 For recreational fishing, the EPA used the travel cost method, which generated 
considerable controversy. Id. at 41,657–58; REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT—FINAL 
PHASE II RULE, supra note 256, at A11-1 to A11-13. 
262 See Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,191–93 
(proposed April 9, 2002) (using “trophic transfer method” and the Habitat Replacement Cost 
method).  
263 In the final rule, the EPA abandoned altogether the Habitat Replacement Cost 
analysis—criticized by Harvard economist Robert Stavins as “empirically invalid” and 
“fundamentally flawed,” Comments of Robert N. Stavins on EPA’s Notice of Data 
Availability for the Proposed 316(b) Phase II Rule ( June 2, 2003) (submitted to EPA, Docket 
ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049-0363)—using instead the far lower (and less complete) 
numbers generated by the trophic transfer model. Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 41,657. 
264 Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,666; see also ECONOMIC 
AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS—FINAL PHASE II RULE, supra note 256, at D1-5 (“A comparison 
of complete costs and incomplete benefits does not provide an accurate picture of net benefits 
to society.”); OMB Review Draft—Proposed Phase II Rule, supra note 251, at 211 (“EPA 
cannot perform a complete benefit-cost comparison because not all of the benefits resulting 
from the proposed regulatory alternative can be valued in dollar terms.”).  
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same weak standards that applied to everyone else.265 And the only reason the EPA 
cited for the change was the numeric result of its CBA: the dollar costs of the rule—
$413 million—outweighed the dollar benefits of the rule—$146 million.266 Despite 
the Agency’s earlier repeated protestations that the benefits estimate was incomplete 
and the directive of its own guidance document to “communicate the full richness” 
of unquantifiable values,267 the EPA made no mention of the numerous 
nonquantified and underquantified benefits.268 We can only assume that OIRA 
ignored the EPA’s admonition to interpret the results of its CBA “with caution” and 
pressured the EPA to do the same.269 
The result was a perfect poster child for what I’m calling false formality. This 
is a corruption of CBA that occurs when the analyst inappropriately combines 
inconsistent positions on two or more of the formality-informality Axes. Here, EPA 
did exactly that. The monetized benefits estimate was, by the Agency’s own 
admission, vastly incomplete, thus placing the analysis well toward the informal end 
of the spectrum on Axis 1. But even so, the Agency applied a balancing test on the 
formal end of Axis 2 that precisely compared the bare numbers, and left out the 
many unquantifiable benefits. The result was a logically incoherent analysis that 
inappropriately combined two inconsistent positions on Axes 1 and 2,270 purporting 
to balance with precision a grossly incomplete estimate of benefits against a 
relatively complete estimate of costs.271 As Professor Doug Kysar put it, “Unable to 
                                                 
265 See Harrington, supra note 130, at 162; EPA, Summary of Major Changes During 
Interagency Review, Docket W-00-3, DCN # 4-4019, at 1 (Feb. 28, 2002). Another change 
was the addition of the site-specific compliance alternative, allowing facilities to escape the 
national performance standards based on a site specific CBA. Id. 
266 Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158; Sinden, supra 
note 105, at 1199–1200. The EPA used the term “significantly outweigh,” but given how 
vastly incomplete the benefits estimate was, this was clearly a nonsensical conclusion. One 
need only imagine that the monetized portion of the benefits represented a third or less of the 
benefits’ full value to see that the balance could easily have tipped the other way—benefits 
outweighing costs. Indeed, natural resources economist Frank Ackerman, Ph.D., in 
comments submitted on the proposed rule, suggested that even just correcting for a few of 
the many inaccuracies in the EPA’s benefits estimate would yield an estimate four to six 
times as high. Comments from Frank Ackerman, Professor, Tufts Univ., on EPA’s Section 
316(b) Stated Preference Survey (July 10, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review). This 
would yield benefits significantly higher than costs, in the range of $584 to $876 million. 
267 GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-2; see Sinden, supra note 105, at 1200. 
268 See supra notes 256–263 and accompanying text.  
269 Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,666. 
270 See supra fig. 7. 
271 This kind of false formality is arguably encouraged by the directive in the EPA’s 
guidelines to calculate a number for net benefits “even if important benefits or costs cannot 
be monetized.” GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-3 (emphasis added). To be fair, however, 
those guidelines also require the agency “to communicate the full richness of benefit and 
cost information beyond what can be put in dollar terms,” id. at 11-2, something the EPA 
failed to do in this instance. 
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measure what was important, EPA instead chose to make important what it could 
measure.”272 The result was patently irrational—180 degrees from Ben Franklin’s 
reasonableness and common sense. 
Two relevant points emerge from this example. First, the Agency went out of 
its way to do formal CBA when it didn’t have to (and when doing so arguably made 
no sense). Second, the formal CBA the Agency did perform provides a perfect 
example of what I’m calling false formality. Another example of an agency moving 
toward the formal end of the CBA spectrum occurred in connection with the EPA’s 
second round of rulemaking on cooling water intake structures, which the next 
section describes.  
 
2.  EPA’s CBA of Cooling Water Intakes: Round II 
 
Perhaps even more surprising than the EPA’s move toward formality in the 
rulemaking leading up to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Riverkeeper is the 
Agency’s dramatic move even further along the formality spectrum in the 
rulemaking that followed.273 Despite the Supreme Court’s expressions of skepticism 
about more formal or “rigorous” varieties of CBA, in drafting the new cooling water 
rule on remand, the EPA moved further toward formality in two ways. First, in order 
to conduct a nationwide CBA of the rule as a whole, the EPA expended substantial 
time and energy conducting a stated-preference survey in what ultimately proved to 
be a “futile” attempt to quantify and monetize the ecological and existence-value 
benefits that it had been unable to quantify the first time around.274 Second, in 
crafting the rules for case-by-case CBA, the EPA—at the behest of OIRA—replaced 
the relatively informal balancing formulas (“wholly disproportionate” and then 
“significantly greater than”), which it had used previously and which had been 
specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court, with the more formal requirement that 
the benefits must “justify” the costs.275  
The story begins in July 2010, a year after the remand, when the EPA 
announced that it would conduct a stated-preference survey in connection with its 
                                                 
272 Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, 
supra note 53, at 199. 
273 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Riverkeeper, the rule was remanded to 
the EPA because the Second Circuit had also invalidated the rule on other grounds not raised 
in the Supreme Court. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) 
(“We of course express no view on the remaining bases for the Second Circuit’s remand 
which did not depend on the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis.”). 
274 See id. at 235 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
275 Interestingly, in developing the new facilities portion of the Phase III rule, a process 
that started years before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Riverkeeper came down, the EPA 
declined to use CBA, citing its inability to reliably quantify the benefits, a decision that the 
Fifth Circuit upheld a year after Riverkeeper in ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 
826–27 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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new version of the cooling water rule.276 The announcement immediately unleashed 
a firestorm of criticism from both industry and environmentalists. Industry 
advocates maintained that the method was inherently unreliable and would vastly 
overstate the benefits of the rule.277 They pointed to the well-known problem of 
“hypothetical bias”—the fact that when asked in a survey what they would 
hypothetically pay for some good, people tend to overestimate what they would be 
willing to pay if they were actually required to take money out of their wallets.278 
Environmental groups, meanwhile, warned that the stated-preference survey would 
understate the rule’s benefits because it framed the question in terms of people’s 
willingness to pay to obtain environmental values rather than their willingness to 
accept payment to give up environmental values—here fish and aquatic ecosystems 
that, “[l]ike the air and water themselves . . . are public trust resources belonging to 
the public at large.”279  
Preliminary results published in June 2012 suggested dramatic results.280 The 
EPA provided figures on households’ willingness to pay for a one percentage point 
improvement in fish mortality levels281 but didn’t tally up its numbers to provide 
final dollar values for total national willingness to pay for each proposed option. 
Professor Frank Ackerman, an economist hired by a set of environmental groups 
commenting on the rule, did the missing arithmetic and concluded that the survey 
                                                 
276 Willingness To Pay Survey for Section 316(b) Existing Facilities Cooling Water 
Intake Structures (New), 75 Fed. Reg. 42,438 (July 21, 2010). 
277 Am. Chem. Council et al., Comments on ICR for Willingness to Pay Survey for 
Section 316(B) Existing Facilities Cooling Water Intake Structures, at 17 (2010) (submitted 
to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2010-0595) [hereinafter ACC Comments (2010)]. 
Indeed, the controversy reached the House of Representatives, where Republican members 
questioned the EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy about the Agency’s use of these surveys 
at a congressional hearing. See Lee Logan, McCarthy Sidesteps GOP Concern about Non-
Use Benefits in Future Rules, INSIDE EPA, Dec. 6, 2013, at 34. 
278 See ACC Comments (2010), supra note 277, at 27. The EPA responded to this 
concern by simply asking survey respondents if they were biased and taking their answers at 
face value. See EPA, SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 
FOR WILLINGNESS TO PAY SURVEY FOR § 316(B) EXISTING FACILITIES COOLING WATER 
INTAKE STRUCTURES: INSTRUMENT, PRE-TEST, AND IMPLEMENTATION 9 (2014), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/316bsupport.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4MX8-9VR2. 
279 See Comments from Reed W. Super, Founder, Super Law Grp., LLC, to EPA, on 
Proposed ICR for Stated Preference Survey for Section 316(b) Rulemaking 6 (Sept. 20, 
2010) (submitted to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OW–2010–0595). This was a reference 
to the endowment effect, discussed above. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.  
280 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations To 
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities; Notice of 
Data Availability Related to EPA’s Stated Preference Survey, 77 Fed. Reg. 34,927, 34,929 
(June 12, 2012). 
281 EPA, SURVEY SUPPORT DOCUMENT: IN SUPPORT OF SECTION 316(b) STATED 
PREFERENCE SURVEY NOTICE OF DATA AVAILABILITY 32–36 (2012).  
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would result in huge numbers for the benefits of the rule as a whole, ranging from 
$1.3 to $7 billion per year. These numbers produced total benefits for all four options 
that would either substantially exceed costs or—using a high 7% discount rate—be 
below costs by such a slight amount as to be within the margin of error.282 Industry 
economists appeared to agree with this assessment and, hence, industry commenters 
urged the EPA to “abandon” its stated-preference survey altogether,283 calling it “ill-
conceived from the outset”284 and “deeply flawed,”285 and complaining that the 
“benefit-cost calculations resulting from the survey are so far out of line with EPA’s 
prior economic estimates as to be totally implausible.”286 Environmentalists, on the 
other hand, identified errors in the EPA’s analysis that they argued skewed the 
results significantly downward. If those errors were corrected, they argued, the 
benefits of the EPA’s most stringent closed cycle cooling option would have 
outweighed the costs by three to one.287 
The EPA finally issued its final rule on May 19, 2014,288 adopting a somewhat 
watered-down version of the rule it had proposed three years earlier.289 But after 
intensive lobbying by industry, the long-anticipated results of the stated-preference 
survey had been axed from the CBA. The preamble gave little in the way of 
explanation for this omission, stating simply, “EPA decided not to employ the 
survey results for purposes of decision-making, and EPA has not accounted for 
values estimated from the survey in the quantitative comparison of costs and 
benefits.”290  
                                                 
282 Comments from Frank Ackerman, supra note 266, at 11. 
283 Util. Water Act Grp. & Edison Elec. Inst., Comments on the Notice of Data 
Availability Related to EPA’s Stated Preference Survey 6 (2012) (submitted to EPA, Docket 
ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667). 
284 Id. at 2. 
285 Id. at 3. 
286 Id. at 4. 
287 Riverkeeper, Inc. et al., Comments on National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System—Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake 
Structures at Existing Facilities 5 (2012) (submitted to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OW–
2008–0667). 
288 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 
48,300, 48,321–22 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125) [hereinafter 
Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand]. 
289 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Cooling Water Intake Structures 
at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174, 22,204–05 (proposed Apr. 
20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125) [hereinafter Proposed Existing Facilities 
Rule Post-Remand]. 
290 Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,350; see also id. at 
48,324–25. At one point, buried deep in the preamble, the EPA suggested obliquely that the 
stated preference survey might have played a role in informing their qualitative estimate of 
the magnitude of the benefits: “While preliminary, and not yet reviewed by EPA’s Science 
Advisory Board, the preliminary results of EPA’s stated preference survey . . . suggest that 
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Thus, the EPA ended up, as it had in the original rule a decade earlier, with a 
monetized estimate of benefits ($33 million annually) that was vastly incomplete 
and far below the annual cost estimate of $275 million.291 Once again, the EPA was 
upfront about the inadequacy of its monetary benefits estimate, noting that “[m]any 
of the benefits that will result from the rule are not monetized or quantified, and as 
a result the Agency’s monetized benefits analysis underestimates the totality of the 
rule’s benefits.”292 But this time, to its credit, the Agency did not, explicitly at least, 
use the fact that the monetized benefits fell short of the costs as a justification for 
weakening the rule. In balancing the costs and benefits, the EPA gave significant 
weight to the unquantified benefits, concluding that the “benefits . . . justify the costs 
of the rule,” even though the monetized benefits fell far short.293  
Thus, while the EPA appears to have avoided engaging in the kind of false 
formality that characterized its first version of the rule, what is notable here is the 
kind of CBA the Agency pursued in response to the Supreme Court’s decision. The 
Agency’s first step after remand was to devote countless hours and resources to 
conducting a stated-preference survey. This represented a dramatic shift in the 
direction of formality, even in the face of a Supreme Court decision clearly 
encouraging the EPA to move in the opposite direction and suggesting that a move 
toward formality might be out of bounds. And, one might say the EPA’s eventual 
abandonment of the survey in connection with the final rule makes Justice Breyer’s 
warning that “attempts at comprehensive monetization” will ultimately prove 
“futile” seem prescient.294 
The EPA also moved toward formality with respect to the other way CBA 
figures in this rulemaking—site-specific CBAs. The Obama EPA’s new rule is far 
more lenient than the original, Bush-era rule that was approved by the Supreme 
Court. The old rule included a variance procedure under which individual plants 
                                                 
[the unquantified benefits] have the potential to be significantly different from zero.” Id. at 
48,415 (citations omitted). But the Agency subsequently hurried to reassure its audience that 
“EPA did not rely on the results of its stated preference survey in estimating the benefits of 
today’s rule.” Id. at 48,401. 
291 Id. at 48,350. 
292 Id. at 48,349. 
293 Id. While this was exactly the kind of situation in which OIRA advises use of a 
break-even analysis, the EPA did not use that term. 
294 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 235 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). While the EPA gave little explanation in the preamble for its 
decision to abandon the stated-preference survey, at certain points it seemed to suggest that 
the stated-preference survey might be an ongoing effort that could conceivably benefit future 
rulemakings. See Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,406 (“EPA 
presents preliminary benefits estimates based on the stated preference survey in the [Benefits 
Assessment] to demonstrate progress on this effort.”). But the EPA’s experience so far with 
the stated-preference survey simply illustrates the degree to which efforts to use highly 
controversial, contestable, and manipulable methods to monetize nonmarket goods 
ultimately shift agency decision making into a highly politicized realm. See Sinden, Defense 
of Absolutes, supra note 2, at 1452–59. 
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could in specific circumstances escape from the national standards by conducting a 
site-specific CBA showing that their compliance costs would be “significantly 
greater than” the benefits.295 But the new rule subjects all facilities to a case-by-case 
BTA determination by state permit writers, based in part on a site-specific CBA.296  
This time the EPA initially used a “wholly disproportionate” standard for these 
site-specific CBAs rather than the “significantly greater than” formulation from the 
Bush-era rule. This may have been in response to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Riverkeeper, in which he questioned the EPA’s use of the “significantly greater 
than” formulation. In the first few decades after passage of the Clean Water Act, 
before it got around to issuing national standards for cooling water intakes, the EPA 
had directed state agencies to do all BTA determinations on a site-specific basis (a 
system not unlike that created by the new rule).297 Under that program, however, the 
EPA had used a “wholly disproportionate” test. Justice Breyer, accordingly, 
objected to the Agency’s failure to explain its departure from that balancing test in 
the Bush-era rule.298 It may be, then, that in drafting the proposed version of the new 
Obama rule, the EPA initially used the original “wholly disproportionate” test in the 
hopes of avoiding having to provide Justice Breyer with an explanation should the 
rule return to the Supreme Court. 
Thus, in the draft proposed rule it submitted to OIRA for review, the EPA 
prohibited state permit writers from rejecting an otherwise available technology 
“unless the social costs of compliance are wholly disproportionate to the social 
benefits.”299 In explaining the use of this informal Axis 2 standard, the EPA stressed 
that the challenges posed by site-specific CBA would necessitate a relatively 
informal position along Axis 1, noting that “when dealing with only a single site 
assessment the quantified and monetized estimates of benefits are more uncertain 
and less comprehensive than the estimates of costs” and that “[i]mportant benefit 
effect categories will very likely not be able to be quantified and monetized.”300 
OIRA, however, pushed the EPA back toward the formal end of the spectrum—
and not just to the “significantly greater” formulation upheld by the Supreme Court 
in the original rule. When the rule emerged from review, OIRA had deleted the 
EPA’s reference to the difficulties of quantification and monetization and replaced 
the “wholly disproportionate” balancing formula with language allowing standards 
                                                 
295 Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,686 (July 9, 2004). 
296 Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300. 
297 See OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT PERMITS DIV., EPA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
EVALUATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES ON THE 
AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT: SECTION 316(b) P.L. 92–500 (1977). 
298 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
299 EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations to 
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and 
Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities 293, 381 (2011) (draft of proposed rule) (on file 
with the Utah Law Review). 
300 Id. at 292. 
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to be loosened whenever costs are not “justified by” benefits.301 While it is not 
entirely clear where exactly on Axis 2 this “justify” formulation falls, it seems safe 
to say that it falls well to the right of the “wholly disproportionate” test.302 Moreover, 
since this formulation tracks the language of the Clinton Executive Order, it can be 
read to embody the same leaning toward formality contained in that document.303 
Thus, in this instance, OIRA pushed the EPA to adopt a brand of CBA that is 
significantly more formal than what the Agency had first proposed or what the 
Supreme Court had endorsed in Riverkeeper.  
In sum, there appears to be a discernable pull in the executive branch toward 
more formal modes of CBA. The executive orders requiring CBA of major agency 
rules and the guidance documents interpreting those orders all hold up formal 
Economic CBA as the goal. Additionally, in the two rulemakings preceding and 
following the Riverkeeper case, we see anecdotal evidence of the EPA leaning hard 
toward formality, even in the face of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion expressing 
substantial doubts about such an approach. 
 
C.  Why the Move Toward Formality? Some Speculations 
 
Why does the executive branch seem to push for more formality in CBA despite 
the fact that more formal versions of CBA clearly spark more controversy in the 
academic community and also appear to be viewed with considerable skepticism by 
both Congress and the federal courts? While I have no definitive answer to this 
question, I offer some speculations below. 
One obvious answer is to simply take the executive orders at their word: the 
executive branch values CBA’s standard setting function and wishes to use it to 
locate economically efficient levels of regulation. Putting aside the many arguments 
from the academic debate about why the notion of efficiency might itself be illusory 
                                                 
301 See EPA, Redlined National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed 
Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing 
Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities 308–09 (2011) [hereinafter EPA 
Redlined Proposed CWIS Rule] (redlined draft of proposed rule) (on file with the Utah Law 
Review) (deleting references to the difficulties and uncertainties associated with 
quantification and monetization quoted above and replacing the “wholly disproportionate” 
test with the “justify” test); see also Proposed Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 22,174, 22,288 (proposed Apr. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). 
This language also appears in the final rule. Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 
Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,352 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). In a 
nod toward informality, the rule does specify (not unlike the executive order) that the site-
specific CBA should include consideration of “qualitative social benefits and costs.” Id. § 
125.98(f)(2)(v). 
302 See supra notes 50–52, 219–220, and accompanying text. 
303 Indeed, the proposed rule (as re-written by OIRA) indicated that the justify 
formulation was based on the executive orders and intended to have the same meaning. See 
EPA Redlined Proposed CWIS Rule, supra note 301, at 151. 
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or perhaps impossible to achieve in practice, another reason to at least perhaps 
hesitate in embracing this explanation emerges from the discussion above. Locating 
the economically efficient level of regulation requires formal Economic CBA, which 
requires measuring costs and benefits for a large number of alternatives. But CBA 
as actually practiced by agencies often evaluates only a single alternative and rarely 
evaluates more than a handful, putting those CBAs well toward the left end of Axis 
3, far from formal Economic CBA.304 Indeed, the most such a litmus-test CBA can 
hope to achieve, assuming reasonably complete monetization, is an indication of 
whether a regulation moves in the general direction of efficiency. But even a 
regulation that passes that test may still be very far from the actual point of net 
benefits maximization. The kind of litmus-test CBA performed by most agencies is 
therefore a rather blunt instrument for achieving efficient regulation.305 
Alternatively, it may be that a concern with transparency is driving the move 
toward formality. Transparency is, after all, one of the stated goals accompanying 
the CBA requirement in Executive Order 12,866—“to make the process more 
accessible and open to the public.”306 And President Obama has devoted 
considerable rhetorical energy to his administration’s commitment to increased 
transparency. 
Some CBA proponents argue that formality increases transparency.307 Dan 
Cole, for example, argues that formal CBA forces the analyst to make methods and 
assumptions explicit, allowing “analysts, the media and interest groups [to] review[], 
challeng[e], replicat[e], or even simply understand[] why a particular decision was 
taken, rather than some other decision.”308 On this view, the more formal a CBA 
is—the more it makes use of data and numbers and mathematical formulas rather 
than gut feeling and instinct—the more its results have the capacity to be replicated 
and therefore checked by others, which creates transparency.  
                                                 
304 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of 
Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 869–
70, 874 (2000) (finding that, in an empirical study of forty-eight federal agency CBAs, “the 
agencies generally did not provide a significant analysis of alternatives”); ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) 
(empirical evidence suggests that CBAs often fail to address a sufficient number of 
alternatives). 
305 See Alan J. Krupnick, The CAMR: An Economist’s Perspective, in REFORMING 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 143 (noting that in practice, CBAs are 
not “sophisticated or comprehensive enough” to identify economically efficient policies).  
306 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 88–92 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted 
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 (2012). 
307 See Sunstein, supra note 63 (stating “[q]uantification helps to promote 
accountability, transparency, and consistency . . . .”); see SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, 
supra note 2, at 9, 27. 
308 Cole, supra note 35, at 69–70. 
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But this is just one of the laundry list of arguments in favor of (formal) CBA 
that sparks heated debate in the academic community. Without delving too far into 
that debate, I will simply note here the argument frequently made by CBA skeptics 
that formal CBA actually inhibits rather than increases transparency. Skeptics 
(including myself in other work) contend that formal CBA obscures the value 
judgments that actually drive CBA behind a veil of seemingly objective and 
scientific numbers, that the numbers tend to eclipse important qualitative 
considerations, and that the technical methods of CBA—which employ 
sophisticated mathematics and abstruse concepts like discounting—are inaccessible 
to members of the general public and thus further tilt the playing field in favor of 
moneyed industrial interests who can afford to hire consultants over cash-strapped 
environmental groups who cannot.309 But this, of course, brings us back to the 
question of why the executive branch would purposely move toward controversy 
rather than away from it.  
It may well be that the reason for the executive branch’s apparent tilt toward 
formality lies primarily in the institutional dynamics relating to the interplay 
between the EPA and OIRA, the details of which are largely beyond the scope of 
this Article. I will nonetheless make a few brief observations in that direction based 
on the recent writings of Professors Cass Sunstein and Lisa Heinzerling. During 
President Obama’s first term, Professor Sunstein was OIRA Director and Professor 
Heinzerling was Associate Administrator of the EPA’s Office of Policy, where she 
interfaced regularly with Professor Sunstein’s OIRA. Professors Sunstein’s and 
Hienzerling’s descriptions of their time in the executive branch both confirm that 
the embrace of formality apparent in the executive orders and guidance documents 
is also reflected in OIRA practice and that OIRA regularly exerts pressure on 
agencies to increase the formality of their CBAs.  
Indeed, by Professor Sunstein’s account, it appears that practices at OIRA have 
moved even more in the direction of formality than those documents themselves 
necessarily require. For example, Professor Sunstein characterizes the language of 
Executive Order 13,563 as “reflect[ing] an unprecedented emphasis on the 
importance of quantification” in the Obama administration.310 In another article, he 
                                                 
309 Coates IV, supra note 9, at 71–79 (arguing formal CBA can be used as “camouflage” 
that can “as or more easily mislead as inform the public,” and CBA requirements may create 
incentives for agencies to make the analysis obscure and difficult to understand); Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2064–65, 2068 
(1998); Sinden, supra note 149, at 219–22. 
310 Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions 
(and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 171 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Real World]; see also Sunstein, supra note 307, at 7 (stating that Executive Order 13,563’s 
requirement that agencies “‘quantify anticipated benefits and costs as accurately as possible’ 
. . . attests to the importance of both quantification and monetization” (quoting Exec. Order 
No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 
(2012)); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1864 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Myths & Realities] 
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boasts about the hard line that his OIRA took on CBA: “If the quantifiable benefits 
are lower than the quantifiable costs, agencies must explain why they seek to 
proceed . . . . In the Obama Administration, it has been very rare for a rule to have 
monetized costs in excess of monetized benefits.”311 And in his book he makes clear 
that, as OIRA director, he did not adopt the informal, kinder and gentler form of 
CBA he had endorsed in his earlier writings: 
 
In fact, we should make a distinction here. On one view, analysis of 
costs and benefits really is just a nudge. Agencies have to produce such an 
analysis, but they do not need to be constrained by it. If the costs outweigh 
the benefits, they remain entitled to go forward. On another view, the 
analysis of costs and benefits is not merely a nudge; it is a rule of decision. 
On this view, agencies cannot proceed unless the benefits justify the costs. 
In the Obama Administration we took the stronger view: Agencies could 
not go forward if the benefits did not justify the costs, unless the law 
required them to do so.312  
 
And in another recent article, Professor Sunstein makes clear that where a 
regulation’s monetized benefits are less than monetized costs, it “will not be easy to 
establish” that the benefits justify the costs.313 
According to Professor Heinzerling, during her tenure at EPA, this meant not 
only that OIRA would prevent rules from going forward if their monetized benefits 
did not exceed their monetized costs, but that OIRA’s push for formality permeated 
the culture at the EPA. In Professor Heinzerling’s words, “OIRA’s fine cost-benefit 
sieve leads EPA personnel to be deeply wary of developing rules that have very high 
costs in relation to their quantified and monetized benefits.” 314 
                                                 
(calling executive order requirements that “benefits of rules justify the costs and that the 
agency has selected the approach that maximizes net benefits . . . exceedingly important” 
(citations omitted)). 
311 Sunstein, Myths & Realities, supra note 310, at 1865–66; see also Sunstein, Real 
World, supra note 310, at 180–81 (noting that where a regulation’s monetized benefits are 
less than monetized costs, “the agency is unlikely to attempt to go forward with this 
regulation,” and if it does, it “will not be easy to establish” that the benefits justify the costs); 
id. at 188 (observing that if an agency were to express monetized benefits in wide ranges, 
“[a] great deal of work would be done to try to achieve greater precision and confidence in 
the numbers”). 
312 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 161 (2013). Compare 
this to Professor Sunstein’s description of the proper role of CBA in his 2002 book, The 
Cost-Benefit State, quoted in Part III.A above. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
313 Sunstein, Real World, supra note 310, at 180–81. 
314 Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 352 
(2014); see also Sunstein, Real World, supra note 310, at 180–81 (noting that where a 
regulation’s monetized benefits are less than monetized costs, “the agency is unlikely to 
attempt to go forward with this regulation”); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing 
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There is also, perhaps, a simple institutional dynamic that contributes to the 
executive branch’s pull toward formality. OIRA’s staff is made up primarily of 
economists, who by their training are probably more likely to favor formal CBA, 
with its explicit grounding in economic theory.315 As noted in Part III.A, of the 
literature advocating for CBA, much of that urging a more formal view of CBA 
comes from formally trained economists.316 Thus, OIRA’s professional culture and 
institutional makeup may be one of the drivers of the push toward formality in the 
executive branch. 
Alternatively, the EPA’s move toward formality in this case may simply be the 
inevitable consequence of what Professor Doug Kysar has called the “cognitive 
lure” of CBA—the irresistible temptation that bureaucrats and policymakers feel to 
justify their decisions with numbers that project an aura of scientific objectivity and 
accuracy.317 Or, as Kysar puts it, “the promise of an ‘objective’ quantitative analysis 
seem[s] difficult to resist in the face of a heavily politicized, deeply uncertain, and 
morally fraught decision.”318  
Professor Wendy Wagner made a similar argument in her case study of the 
CBA accompanying the EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule. Professor Wagner argued 
that in this rulemaking, CBA served not as a decisionmaking tool, but rather as a 
strategic advocacy document “to help insulate the agency from inevitable legal and 
political attack.”319 If, from the agency’s perspective, defense and justification of 
their chosen rule is the goal, then it is easy to see how formality, or at least the 
appearance of formality, would appear to be the best strategy.320 Numbers convey 
                                                 
Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 243–44 
(2012) (discussing dynamic set up by centralized review of agency rules by OIRA, as giving 
OIRA significant power and sway over agency rule making).  
315 See Steinzor, supra note 314, at 276, 283. 
316 See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text. 
317 Kysar, Fish Tales, supra note 272, at 190, 197. 
318 Id.; see also Cole, supra note 35, at 69 (observing that “government increasingly 
rel[ies] on [CBA] as a tool in policymaking” despite its “various subjective and manipulable 
elements” in part because it “appear[s] more scientific,” and because it allows “decision 
makers . . . [to] boil down fundamental questions of regulatory policy to a single number (or 
a set of numbers . . . ), which creates the impression (or misimpression) that the policy choice 
is . . . clear”). 
319 Wagner, supra note 122, at 57; see also Coates IV, supra note 9, at 91–92 (stating 
agencies may use CBA strategically); Alan J. Krupnick, The CAMR: An Economist’s 
Perspective, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 142 (“When 
an RIA is issued contemporaneously with the rule itself, . . . the RIA becomes mere 
justification for the agency’s choices rather than a means of informing and improving the 
ultimate choice.”); THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF 
OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 194 (1995). 
320 See Coates IV, supra note 9, at 75 (noting that the SEC acted rationally in making 
CBA purposely opaque, using it to camouflage their real reasoning in order to defeat future 
court challenges); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 132, at 47–53 (demonstrating that when 
an agency has good quantifiable data on a rule’s benefits—as the EPA does on the health 
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an aura of scientific accuracy and objectivity that qualitative descriptions cannot 
match.321 Similarly, formality might serve to insulate the White House and OIRA 
from charges of political meddling in agency decisionmaking. If OIRA can point to 
the numbers in a formal CBA as a reason for pushing an agency to change a proposed 
rule, OIRA’s role may appear less political and more scientific or technical.322 
It may be that this “cognitive lure” is in part also fueled by the adversarial 
dynamics that inevitably play out between industry and environmentalists, 
especially with respect to high-profile rules like this one. In earlier work I have 
suggested that these dynamics take the form of “an ongoing tug-of-war between 
environmentalists and industry in which each side will progressively force [the 
agency] to spend more and more money seeking the holy grail of accuracy in the 
quantification of costs and benefits.”323 I argued that advocates on both sides would 
face incentives to push for increased formality in CBA:  
 
Though [the agency] may start by performing rough apples-to-oranges 
comparisons in order to avoid quantifying benefits, a determination to 
[regulate more or less stringently] based on such an analysis will inevitably 
lead the disappointed constituency to sue claiming that benefits should 
have been quantified to ensure an objective and accurate cost-benefit 
analysis. Ultimately, unless [the agency] takes a stand in favor of 
[informality] . . . and . . . is backed up by the courts, this political dynamic 
will lead ineluctably to a more and more quantitative, complicated, and 
costly analysis.324 
 
One might cite as a counterexample industry’s recent arguments urging the 
EPA to drop the stated preference survey for its cooling water intake rule in the wake 
of results suggesting huge willingness-to-pay values for protecting aquatic life. But 
industry did not in that context urge the EPA to abandon formality per se. Rather, 
this argument represents a disagreement about which methods of formality to use, 
disagreements that are only likely to proliferate as formality increases and analysts 
turn with more frequency to controversial and contestable methods like contingent 
                                                 
effects of particulate matter pollution—it might view formal CBA as a way to defend a 
stringent rule: that certain air quality standards under the Clean Air Act would be more 
stringent if set by formal CBA rather than health-based criteria). 
321 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. But see Charles Gowan et al., The Role 
of Ecosystem Valuation in Environmental Decision Making: Hydropower Relicensing and 
Dam Removal on the Elwha River, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 508 (2006) (providing an 
empirical study of a dam removal decision suggesting that decision makers and stakeholders 
prefer qualitative projections as the basis for negotiation and decision making and tend to 
ignore monetized valuations). 
322 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative 
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1168–70 (2014). 
323 Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 183. 
324 Id. (citations omitted). 
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valuation. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the environmentalists, who 
generally oppose formality, found themselves in the position of arguing in favor of 
the EPA’s stated-preference survey because it appeared likely to produce results that 
would support more stringent regulation.325 In this way, environmentalists’ usual 
opposition to formal varieties of CBA may often be neutralized in specific cases. 
A thorough understanding of the forces driving the executive branch’s apparent 
tilt toward formality is largely beyond the scope of this Article. It may, however, 
reflect an attempt to achieve efficiency, a belief that formality will increase 
transparency, the institutional dynamics between the EPA and OIRA, the adversarial 
dynamics between industry and environmentalists, or perhaps simply the “cognitive 
lure” of formality. 
 
VI.  LESSONS FOR THE LARGER DEBATE 
 
The foregoing analysis of the distinctions between formal and informal CBA 
provides some lessons for the larger debate over CBA. The first lesson is about 
doctrine: if we view CBA as a monolithic concept, then we risk misinterpreting those 
cases and statutes that do endorse agency use of CBA as ratifying all forms of CBA, 
no matter how formal. But that’s a highly misleading reading of the law. The second 
lesson is about the broader debate: failing to carefully distinguish between formal 
and informal forms of CBA gives the proponents of CBA the ability to facilely use 
Ben Franklin as a shield in a way that muddies the debate and deflects attention from 
the pitfalls and dangers of formality. The third lesson is about function: different 
forms of CBA perform different functions in the decisionmaking process. Failing to 
differentiate among levels of formality in CBA leads to sloppiness and confusion 
about the function that CBA serves. The fourth lesson is about analytic integrity: 
carefully distinguishing among different forms of CBA helps to avoid the 
intellectual sloppiness and false formality that can occur when the CBA analyst tries 
to combine inconsistent positions along the three axes of formality. Each of these 
lessons is detailed in turn below. 
 
A.  Doctrine 
 
If we’re not careful to define terms and we lump all forms of CBA together into 
one category, then we risk misinterpreting the law. Viewing CBA as a monolith 
leads to a reading of Riverkeeper as endorsing agency use of all forms of CBA, 
including highly formalized versions. Indeed, that appears to be how the EPA is 
interpreting the case. But that’s a highly inaccurate reading. As detailed above, the 
vast majority of circuit court opinions upholding agency uses of CBA prior to 
Riverkeeper also endorsed only relatively informal varieties of CBA, and a number 
                                                 
325 See Logan, supra note 277, at 34 (noting that “[e]nvironmentalists generally support 
[stated-preference] surveys, saying they account for benefits that are often ignored or ‘zeroed 
out’ in cost-benefit reviews”). 
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of courts have expressed considerable skepticism about formal CBA, similar to that 
voiced by the Supreme Court in Riverkeeper. Accordingly, it is far more accurate to 
characterize the body of federal environmental statutory and case law as generally 
disfavoring CBA, but favoring decidedly informal varieties of CBA in those 
relatively rare instances when its use is sanctioned. With only a few exceptions, both 
Congress and the federal courts have adopted this view, expressing considerable 
skepticism about more formal versions of CBA. 
 
B.  Debate 
 
Treating CBA as a monolith also allows proponents of CBA to use Ben 
Franklin as a shield—that is, to equate all forms of CBA with rationality, 
reasonableness, and common sense. Yet, as the above analysis has shown, informal, 
Ben Franklin-style CBA has very little in common with formal Economic CBA. For 
one thing, Ben Franklin CBA involves no conversion of nonmarket values into 
monetary terms, which is the source of most of the controversy that surrounds formal 
Economic CBA. Additionally, these two forms of CBA perform very different 
functions in decisionmaking. Informal Ben Franklin CBA is a secondary check or 
litmus test applied after a particular regulatory option has already been chosen by 
other means. Formal Economic CBA, on the other hand, is a decisionmaking 
standard that selects the efficient regulatory alternative from a whole range of 
options.  
While there may be compelling arguments in favor of formal Economic CBA 
as a decisionmaking tool, they do not include appeals to Ben Franklin and simple 
homespun common sense. Rather, they require complex explications of economic 
theory (or broader theories of welfare and well-being).326 If participants on both 
sides of the debate are more careful about recognizing the distinctions between 
formal and informal varieties of CBA, then facile, but ultimately unhelpful, allusions 
to Ben Franklin can be taken off the table.  
 
C.  Function 
 
As mentioned above, different kinds of CBA perform significantly different 
functions in the decisionmaking process. This aspect of the formality-informality 
spectrum arises out of Axis 3 (number of alternatives). As one moves to the right on 
Axis 3, CBA shifts from a secondary filter applied to a single alternative (or a small 
number of alternatives) chosen by other means to an actual standard setting tool that 
identifies the efficient (welfare maximizing) alternative. This is a crucial distinction, 
and failing to recognize it leads to muddled thinking.327 The most common error is 
                                                 
326 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 1–25. 
327 In its proposed cooling water intake structure rule on remand, the EPA appears to 
have treated CBA as a secondary check. Even though it purported to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of four different options, it only did a comprehensive balancing of costs against 
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assuming a regulation that passes a litmus-test CBA is therefore optimally efficient. 
This is not the case, as Part II explains. 
 
D.  Analytic Integrity 
 
Breaking the CBA formality spectrum down into three axes, as the typology in 
Part II does, allows us to see the relationships between them. As a matter of simple 
logic, certain moves along one axis generally require corresponding moves along 
the other axes. Thus, if a CBA is at the informal end of Axis 1—describing costs 
and benefits in purely qualitative terms—it cannot possibly move even to the middle 
position on Axis 2. That is, it cannot balance costs and benefits with precision. 
Similarly, if a CBA is at the informal end of Axis 3—measuring the costs and 
benefits of only a single alternative—it cannot possibly move all the way to 
formality on Axis 2, identifying the point of equivalence between marginal benefits 
and costs.  
Confusion or sloppiness about these relationships between axes leads to 
intellectual incoherence and sometimes to a particular brand of incoherence I have 
dubbed false formality. An example of this false formality can be found in the EPA’s 
CBA of its cooling water intake rule in the lead up to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Riverkeeper. This CBA was on the informal end of Axis 1, monetizing most costs 
but only a small portion of benefits, leaving most benefits unquantified and 
unmonetized. This, of course, necessitated staying toward the left side of Axis 2, 
performing only a rough apples-to-oranges balancing. Instead, though, when the 
time came for balancing, the EPA treated the analysis as though it were formal—
performing a precise comparison of two single numbers, without mentioning the fact 
that the lower number was vastly incomplete.328 But this was, of course, 
nonsensical—the direct opposite of the rationality and common sense to which 
CBA’s supporters lay claim. And it arose from a failure to pay close attention to 
where the CBA fell on the formality-informality spectrum and a failure to respect 
the relationships between the axes of formality.  
There are other examples of this false formality in which the Agency, in 
Professor Wendy Wagner’s words, exhibits an “obsession with the precise 
                                                 
benefits (quantified and unquantified) for the preferred option. See Proposed Existing 
Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174, 22,267–68 (proposed Apr. 20, 2011) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). This balancing yielded the conclusion that the benefits 
of the preferred option justified its costs. Id. But it could well be that benefits also justified 
costs for the other options as well. Indeed, after the preliminary results of the stated-
preference survey came in, economist Frank Ackerman’s calculations suggested that net 
benefits would actually be higher for the more stringent options. See Comments from Frank 
Ackerman, supra note 266, at 1, 11. 
328 The EPA’s guidelines facilitate this by requiring the analyst to calculate net benefits 
even where important benefits cannot be quantified. GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-3; see 
supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. 
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quantification of a subset of benefits.”329 Professor Wagner had this to say, for 
example, about the CBA that the EPA conducted in connection with its 2005 Clean 
Air Interstate Rule: 
 
[I]f EPA cannot even be sure it has quantified the bulk of the benefits, 
subsequent monetization of the remaining quantified benefits becomes 
practically useless. If (x + y) = social benefits, and y is unknown but is 
potentially large and perhaps even greater than x, then excessive efforts at 
monetization of x is not going to move the ball forward in finding the 
efficient balance point where marginal benefits meet marginal costs. This 
is not meant to suggest that the appropriate remedy is for EPA to simply 
put more resources into quantification of y, . . . however. EPA persuasively 
made a case that the ecological benefits were so difficult to predict, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, that any estimation would amount to an 
unverifiable guess. The appropriate response to these quantitative 
problems is to acknowledge them and abort efforts to arrive at aggregate, 
monetized costs and benefits.  
Indeed, to nevertheless persist with incomplete quantification in such 
circumstances is . . . analytically corrupt . . . .330 
 
This kind of false formality, or analytic corruption, results in part from a lack of 
clarity about the distinctions between formal and informal varieties of CBA and the 
relationships between the three axes of the formality-informality spectrum. Clarity 
about where a particular CBA falls along each of the three axes and about the 
relationships between those axes would go a long way toward preventing the kind 
of false formality that occurred in the first iteration of the cooling water rule and that 
Professor Wagner identified in connection with the Clean Air Interstate Rule. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the now decades-long debate over the use of CBA in agency rulemaking, the 
participants have often failed to define the term. “Cost-benefit analysis” can refer to 
                                                 
329 Wagner, supra note 122, at 66; see also Coates IV, supra note 9, at 52–53 (criticizing 
the D.C. Circuit for insisting that the SEC quantify a small subset of costs where larger costs 
and all benefits cannot be quantified in any case); Keohane, supra note 72, at 47 (calling the 
EPA’s CBA for the Clean Air Interstate Rule “almost compulsive in its precision—as 
illustrated by its patient exploration of categories of impacts . . . that do not even amount to 
rounding error, being measured in the tens of millions relative to total benefits in the tens of 
billions”); O’Neill, supra note 53, at 119 (calling the CBA of the EPA’s 2005 Clean Air 
Mercury Rule “a complete cost-incomplete benefit analysis”). 
330 Wagner, supra note 122, at 65; see also Keohane, supra note 72, at 49 (“In a sterling 
example of mistaking precision for accuracy, the CAIR RIA presents results to three 
significant digits without regard to the considerable error bounds surrounding its 
estimates.”). 
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a variety of different practices that span a large spectrum, from informal Ben 
Franklin CBA to formal Economic CBA. In the preceding pages I have constructed 
a typology of formality in CBA, which arranges the variety of forms of CBA along 
three axes in order to clarify the distinctions between and relationships among them. 
I hope that this typology helps to show why failing to distinguish between formal 
and informal CBA and the many varieties in between, leads to muddled thinking and 
to misuses of CBA. 
I have also shown that when we examine the academic debate as well as the 
law concerning CBA with an ear tuned to these distinctions, several important points 
emerge. First, in the academic debate, those who oppose CBA tend to paint it in very 
formal terms, while those who support it are apt to paint it as less formal. This 
suggests that any room for consensus is far more likely to be found at the informal 
end of the spectrum. Second, the law largely seems to favor informal CBA as well. 
This is true both in the body of federal environmental statutes and in the federal case 
law. In light of these tendencies in the literature and the law, one might expect to see 
the executive branch moving as much as possible toward the informal end of the 
spectrum. Examination of executive orders, guidance documents, and a few 
anecdotal examples from the EPA, however, seems to suggest a pull in the opposite 
direction.  
Skeptics, like myself, worry that this pull toward formality tends to diminish 
rather than enhance the quality of agency decisionmaking for all the reasons that 
have emerged over the years in the broader academic debate over the merits of CBA. 
But the analysis here suggests additional reasons for concern. The trend toward 
formality may also lead to more instances of false formality—a corruption of CBA 
that can occur when agencies fail to clearly define where on the formality-
informality spectrum a particular CBA falls. Or it may lead to “futility”331 of the 
type that occurred in connection with the EPA’s latest efforts on the cooling water 
rule, when their stated-preference survey provoked such controversy that, after an 
investment of considerable time and resources, the Agency dropped it altogether. 
Others may have different views on the desirability of formal versus informal modes 
of CBA, but before a discussion of these issues can occur, the first step is to simply 
recognize the existence and significance of these distinctions. 
                                                 
331 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 235 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
